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ABSTRACT  
Small medical practices store and process the health information of their patients in 
order to aid in providing care to them. Because of this a level of trust exists between 
the patients and the practice to ensure the sensitive medical data is kept private and 
secure. There was no formalised way to test if this trust was well deserved and what 
level of protection was applied to such sensitive health records. A security model that 
is applicable to small medical practices for the purpose of protecting and securing the 
personal health information they store was constructed and validated by a security 
expert from the security industry. This model was then applied to a number of small 
medical practices to assess the level of data protection and computer security of 
medical information present in the surveyed practices. In general the practices were 
found to be complying with the security model, some discrepancies were discovered 
and noted. A formalised way to test if the trust patients place in their medical practices 
is well deserved now exists. The trust that the patients of the small medical practices 
surveyed placed in their practices was well deserved. 
 
Key words: Data Protection, Computer Security, Security Modelling, Small Medical 
Practices, Personal Health Information and Records, Health Information Systems,  
list 5 to 8 words 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to the project 
Increasingly large amounts of personal and private medical data are being stored and 
transmitted in and through electronic systems in medical practices such as small 
General Practitioners Surgeries. This has serious data protection ramifications as such 
information is regarded as particularly sensitive when stored in systems that keep 
electronic health records. Health data is defined as: 
 
 “Sensitive personal data” means personal data as to… (c) the physical or 
mental health or condition or sexual life of the data subject” 
 
The DATA PROTECTION ACT, (1988), Section 1. (1) (C). 
 
There are other terms for such medical data, including PHI, Protected Health 
Information, which is defined under the Health Information and Portability and 
Accountability Act, (HIPAA), as follows: 
 
“PHI is individually identifiable health information that is transmitted or 
maintained in any form or medium (e.g., electronic, paper, or oral), but 
excludes certain educational records and employment records” 
 
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003) 
 
PHI can also be taken to refer to Personal Health Information, which is essentially the 
same as protected health information and medical data but, Personal Health 
Information is a more common European and Irish term as opposed to the American 
term of Protected Health Information. For the purposes of this project the two are 
taken to be the same thing. 
 
This project examines the level of data security and protection in small medical 
practices. A security model suitable for the small medical practices will be established 
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and this will be used as the foundation for assessing the level of data security and 
protection in the surveyed small medical practices. 
 
Non technical users of GPs’ IT systems may not be aware that these systems should be 
secure, how they should be secured or why they should be secured. Walsh, (2010), 
points to “folk model’s” that users use to secure their home computers and the flaws 
that they contain. There is a perception of “bad” things and people on the Internet, 
which can cause harm to a person’s computer or to the person themselves through 
theft, but these are perceptions as opposed to concrete understandings. It is reasonable 
to assume that users of computing systems in small medical practices who are not 
technical experts in the field of computing or computer security may apply similar 
“folk models” to the security of the systems that they use if they are responsible for 
securing them or have any ability to do so, i.e. administrative privileges to their 
workstations. This has the potential to expose any data on those systems, including 
Protected Health Information, (PHI), to the risk of compromise as the “folk model’s” 
the users may use can allow them to justify ignoring best practice security advice.  
 
In order to understand the problem domain it is necessary to understand the core 
concepts of computer security, Stoneburner, (2001), lists the objectives of computer 
security as: 
1. Availability 
2. Integrity 
3. Confidentiality 
4. Accountability 
5. Assurance 
 
The most important of those from the perspective of PHI and health data in small 
medical practices is confidentiality. Confidentiality of that information is paramount, 
for instance Whiddet, et al, (2005) identified significant reluctance amongst patients to 
share sensitive information with receptionists and managers when dealing with 
medical information. 
 
This project will attempt to better understand the state of confidentiality, availability, 
integrity, assurance and accountability in the surveyed small medical practices. 
   11 
1.2 Background 
The place for health data that small medical practitioners store and process is in the 
wider context of computer and data security. The over-riding objective of this project 
is in relation to data protection and computer security in small medical practices, but 
these goals cannot exist in a stand-alone context as that would limit the understanding 
of the problem domain and thus it is necessary to draw from other sources and areas, 
such as protections applied to normal information technology assets and other best 
practices. 
 
The global security arena has experienced a number of high profile security incidents, 
such as the attack on Sony’s Playstation network that exposed the user data of millions 
of users, Goodin, (2011). In Drummond, (2010), Google outlined the attack that 
emanated against them from China which stole intellectual property from their 
network. The Anonymous group unsuccessfully attempted to launch a distributed 
denial of service attack against Amazon but was more successful against PayPal, 
Vijayan, (2010). 
 
Incidents like these can have a bearing for the future in small medical practices, they 
may not have experienced similar attacks at this stage but there is potential for such in 
the future and thus guidance is needed now. For example the Sony attack happened 
because of poor procedures for patching the Apache webserver’s running the Sony 
network and a lack of firewalls between the webserver and the internet. Those were 
costly mistakes, but mistakes that are easy to replicate by anyone. 
 
Also, it is necessary to take into consideration from the forthcoming Health 
Information Bill that it is expected that even more health data will be stored 
electronically so health information can be better utilised to provide better health care 
to the public. 
 
“It is widely recognized, however, that it, [Health Data], can have other 
positive uses that would benefit the health system as a whole in facilitating 
better planning, management and delivery of services” 
 
   12 
Department of Health and Children (2008, p. 2) 
 
Further one of the goals of the HIB is to: 
 
“Protect the privacy, confidentiality, security and integrity of personal health 
information and ensure that these principles apply explicitly to all persons (and 
not just clinicians) who have a legitimate reason, in certain situations, to be 
involved with or access such information: for example, medical students, 
healthcare administrative personnel, software and hardware vendors who 
supply and maintain health information systems;” 
 
Department of Health and Children, (2008, p. 12) 
 
It is in this context that this project intends to provide a mechanism by which the 
protection offered to such important data can be evaluated. 
 
A friend of the author visited their General Practitioner and noted how the person 
working at reception, who was not a medical practitioner, had full access to the paper 
based health records for all the patients of the practice. This was needed to facilitate 
the member of staff being able to do their job but the question as to the appropriateness 
of that was still valid. 
 
This prompted some debate as to the level of computer security and data protection of 
the health records in such practices. Mearian, (2011), cites a survey that found that 
“30% of doctors lack basic anti-virus software and 34% do not have network firewalls 
in place”. These are worrying statistics especially when other anecdotal evidence is 
examined, Irish Health, (2010), point out how the Data Protection Commissioner of 
Ireland advised the Health Service Executive to improve data security in it s 2010 
annual report. Further evidence from Irish Health, (2008), and Irish Health, (2009), 
report data breaches of health related information. 
 
Other similar incidents relating to taped backup and data transfers can be cited, 
Fonseca, (2008), where 2 million health records were exposed when backup tapes were 
stolen, a similar story in the Irish Times (2009), when another data tape containing 
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medical records was lost when being transferred from a medical surgery. The BBC in 
(BBC, 2008) reported a case where again a surgery had a backup tape stolen. 
 
Studies have been conducted into data breaches that have compromised sensitive 
health information and there is considerable anecdotal and widely reported evidence of 
sensitive health data being lost. 
 
“In the case of Isis Machado mentioned earlier, she was charged and fined 
under HIPAA for disclosing individually identifiable medical records” 
 
Johnson, (2009) 
 
“One GP downloaded a complete patient database, including the medical 
histories of 10,000 people, on to an unsecured laptop. The laptop was then 
stolen from his home and never retrieved” 
 
Savage, (2009) 
 
However, historically we have not done well protecting this data and studies have 
called for more stringent protections for it: 
 
“Health-care providers and insurers must enact better monitoring and 
information controls to detect and stop leaks.  Information access within many 
healthcare systems is lax” 
 
Johnson, (2009) 
1.3 Research problem 
With the advent of digitalisation of office records, including patient health records 
GP’s no longer keep just paper records of ailments and illnesses of the patients who he 
or she tended to. Even with a paper based records model there was a risk of un-
authorised persons gaining access to that extremely sensitive and confidential 
information, but that risk was mitigated through the securing of the paper files in a 
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filing cabinet in a locked office and building. This security model is also relatively 
easy to understand, keep the doors locked and only give a key to a person who should 
have access.  
 
Now though such information is stored in electronic format over a myriad of storage 
and processing options, a local file server or fully externally and possibly 
internationally hosted software as a service application. Further the data has spread 
throughout other applications and media. A doctor or care worker can now copy and 
paste a patients information from an electronic health information system into their 
email client and send themselves an email to work on from home later. Alternatively 
they may store such records on a memory stick or laptop computer and remove it from 
the environments of the surgery.  
 
Where previously a file was one physical object, which if taken from its primary 
storage location its removal could be noticed. Now though, because of the ease of 
manipulation of electronic data taking a copy of information is no longer as easy to 
notice. In addition, where the previous security mechanisms and models of locked keys 
were easy to understand by non-expert people in the field of Information and 
Communications Technology, any current model, if there is one, is less easy for a lay 
person to understand. It would not be possible to completely reduce the complexity of 
such a model of protection of complicated inter dependent and co dependent systems 
and processes to the state where a person who is not an expert in the field can 
immediately grasp the nature of such difficult concepts as public, private key 
encryption and authorization and access controls.  
 
However, the important people who harness and manipulate the data can and need to 
be aided in understanding the complex eco system that the data resides in and a guide 
to the successfulness of their organisations attempts to protect that confidential data 
can be provided. In essence, that is one of the aims of this project, to increase 
understanding of the importance of computer security and data protection for small 
medical practices, making it a less difficult to understand quagmire to the people that 
walk through it every day and to be able to estimate the current state of protection 
offered at the surveyed practices. 
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The secondary research for this project was unable to find evidence if an assessment of 
the level of data protection applied to health information in small medical practices in 
Ireland or anywhere else has been carried out. This leads to issues for planning what if, 
anything, needs to be done to improve on the current situation. The author has been 
unable to determine if an assessment of the current level of data protection for personal 
health information on the ground, so to speak, has been carried out in Ireland or 
elsewhere. It is not possible at this stage to ascertain if the practices used to protect 
personal health information in Ireland are adequate. Thus there is no “base level” of 
the protection and security of PHI or a way to accurate assesses that level. The 
protection of  
 
 “Designers of military and banking systems can refer to Bell & LaPadula 
(1973) and Clark & Wilson (1987) respectively, but there is no comparable 
security policy model that spells out clear and concise access rules for clinical 
information systems” 
 
Anderson, (1996, p.1) 
1.4 Intellectual challenge 
The intellectual challenges of this project span many areas. 
 
• Data Protection Legislation and governance 
 
• Security issues and methods specifically tailored for systems that deal with PHI 
 
• General security concepts applicable to any organisation 
 
• Understanding the common factors and components of the systems used in 
small medical practices 
 
• The limitations and resource difficulties of the small medical practices 
themselves 
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• The conceptual effort to create a security model that is applicable to such 
environments and being able to apply it to them adequately 
 
The data security and protection model has is somewhat novel, it is implementing 
procedures and practices that are common in small and medium sized offices around 
the world to protect their assets, but doing so from a unique perspective that aides in 
the understanding and assessment of data security and protection measures. Small 
medical practices operate in those types of environments yet the data they store on 
their customers is potentially very sensitive and damaging should it be lost. A way of 
being able to understand the systems and procedures in their environment is required 
and in order to do that a design is required that can be used as a controlled base to 
measure against. 
1.5 Research objectives 
The aim of this project is to construct a valid security model that can be used to assess 
the state of data protection and computer security in small medical practices. The 
model will then be applied to a sample of such practices in order to understand the 
level of protection in those practices.  
 
The following were the objectives for this project: 
 
1. Perform a literature review on data protection legislation 
 
2. Perform a literature review on security matters for specifically PHI related 
systems as well as a more general review for more common security matters 
 
3. Create a security model applicable to and appropriate for small medical 
practices 
 
4. Test the security model to ensure its correctness for the problem domain. This 
test was to be performed by an external security expert 
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5. Test the model in a selection of small medical practices to determine the level 
of data security and protection therein and also the level of appropriateness of 
implementation of the model within the medical practice 
 
6. Evaluate the results of the tests to determine the level of data security and 
protection in the surveyed medical practices, the correctness of the model for 
the problem domain and the ease of applicability of the model in the practices. 
1.6 Research methodology 
Both primary and secondary research was performed for this project. 
 
The primary research involved formal, structured interviews with stakeholders in small 
medical practices to ascertain the level of data security and protection in their practice. 
Also feedback was sought from an expert in the field of computer security to ascertain 
the validity of the constructed computer security model. 
 
The secondary research involved a literature review of material that would assist in 
meeting the objectives of the project. The material covered was 
 
• The regulatory framework provided by Irish and European Data Protection 
Legislation. What legislation and directives are in place and the requirements 
they place on data controllers 
 
• Computer security applied specifically to software and systems that store and 
processes PHI directly 
 
• Computer security applied to the more general security field for software and 
systems that may not directly store and processes PHI but may process it in a 
transient manner, e.g. network traffic or for systems that may deal with related 
meta data, e.g. file servers that store copies of letters sent to patients that may 
contain PHI 
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The results of the literature review and the constructed data security and protection 
model for small medical practices were used in the primary research. Resources 
The following resources are required to complete the project. 
 
• Access to stakeholders in small medical practices who have the necessary 
information in regards the systems and procedures in place around data security 
and protection 
 
• Access to a security expert to review and assess the security and data protection 
framework designed for application to small medical practices 
 
• Access to dissertation supervisor is essential for both guidance and quality 
control purposes 
 
• Access to Library resources, both printed and electronic for research purposes 
 
• Personal computing equipment and internet access 
 
1.7 Scope and limitations 
The scope of this project will be specifically focus to the 4th rule of the Data Protection 
Commissioner, (n.d.), 8 rules for data protection, the rule to keep the personal data safe 
and secure. This will apply to the systems and procedures that control the personal 
health information and how it is accessed and processed. The other rules of data 
protection are also important however and they will feature in the overall design of the 
security model, a particular focus is placed on data protection governance in chapter 
two to aide this. 
 
The approach being taken for this project is limited to the personal health information 
and health data that small medical practices store and process, other sensitive 
information such as financial data will not be directly considered. Also, only systems 
and procedures that interact directly with personal health information will be 
examined. That will include networks and systems that may not be direct processors of 
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personal health information but if such information passes through them, such as 
networks and email services will be considered. 
 
Larger medical practices such as hospitals or large surgeries will not be examined as 
part of this project. 
1.8 Organisation of the dissertation  
 
Chapter two introduces the reader to the regulatory framework around PHI. It 
examines Irish Data Protection Law and its European counterparts. The intention is to 
provide the legal basis for which the need for compliance with data protection law is 
required and to aide in understanding what has to be achieved by this. 
 
Chapter three examines the state of the art in regards security for PHI. It is subdivided 
into two streams. The first, which examines the concepts behind secure systems 
designed specifically to deal with PHI, e.g. Health Information Systems and Electronic 
Health Record Systems. This forms part of the basis to assist in evaluating the state of 
data security and protection of PHI in small medical practices from the perspective of 
the software that processes the health information. The second stream deals with the 
more general field of system and network security of small office and home office 
environments. This perspective is important as such environments are similar to those 
deployed in small medical practices and which then process and transfer the PHI. 
 
Chapter four constructs a security model based on the findings of the proceeding 
chapters as well as industry best practices and guidelines for small medical practices. 
This model will be used to assess the state of data security and protection in a small 
medical practice. 
 
Chapter five assesses the constructed security model. The model is assessed from the 
perspective of its correctness to achieve its aim of ensuring the security for the 
environment to which it will be applied. An external security expert will conduct this 
part of the assessment. Chapter five also deals with bringing the security model to the 
surveyed small medical practices. Chapter five deals with the results of the assessment 
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the practices compared to the security model and evaluates them to determine the level 
of data security in the assessed small medical practices. 
 
Chapter six draws conclusions and makes recommendations for future works. 
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2 DATA PROTECTION LEGSILATION AND 
GOVERNANCE  
2.1 Introduction 
Small medical practices deal with the protected health information, (PHI), and medical 
data or their patients in order to provide the services that their patients require. Dealing 
with such information is a trade-off, it provides a benefit of more efficiently being able 
to treat their patients but it also places a burden of protection upon the small medical 
practices to ensure that the personal health information and medical data is protected. 
 
This chapter will outline the legislative and governance matters that small medical 
practices in Ireland will face when dealing with protected health information and 
medical data. 
 
2.2 Data Protection Legislation overview 
The primary legislative framework and guidance that small medical practices operate 
under with regards to the protection of the personal and private data which they collect 
and process is the Data Protection Act, (1988) and Data Protection (Amendment), 
(2003). In addition to this EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection) has had an impact on 
the formulation of such policy because it deals in depth with the matter of Data 
Protection and Data Protection legislation harmonisation across the union. There are in 
addition other policy instruments from the European Commission and Council of 
Europe that have an impact on data protection and the protection of health information 
in particular. This section will focus on this legislative framework. 
 
As mentioned there are a number of policy instruments in place for the area of data 
protection of small medical practices in Ireland and the wider area of Europe as a 
whole, more will be expanded upon further in this chapter. There are also legislative 
frameworks that do not apply to Irish and European small medical practices due to the 
practices not being governed by the jurisdiction of  the legislative frameworks.  
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These include the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, (1996), HIPAA 
for short, which is a specifically health data legislative tool in the United States that 
mandates both a security rule and privacy rule for the sensitive data that the Act 
governs. The privacy rule controls how PHI can be used and disclosed, (Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2010). While the security rule prescribes the safeguards 
that should be put in place to maintain the privacy of specifically electronically stored 
PHI (Department of Health and Human Service, 2003). It tiers the security safeguards 
into three area’, administrative safeguards, physical safeguards and technical 
safeguards. Within each of these areas a number of criteria and standards are required 
to protect the PHI that the covered entity may posses. 
 
The HIPAA is not however without its detractors, it has been argued how a lack of 
technical granularity in HIPAA undermines the right of the patient to privacy due to 
the generalised nature of the standards used in HIPAA, because the specifics of how to 
achieve the aim are not provided, privacy is damaged because of such, (Wafa, 2010). 
As Wafa puts it,  
 
“providers are free to deploy solutions, which may be cost-effective, but are 
outdated or unsound, thereby giving a false impression that they have secured 
protected health information” 
 
Wafa, (2010) 
 
This is an interesting point and the paper goes on to further argue that the lack of 
specific instructions in the area of encryption puts health data at risk as the “drafters in 
their definition have nurtured a confusing, divisive, duplicative, and obscenest 
environment”, (Wafa, 2010). This is a similar point that section 2.4 of this chapter will 
approach from the perspective of Irish and European legislation, but a different 
conclusion will be reached. 
 
It should be noted that the research and context for this project takes place in Ireland, 
hence the focus will primarily be upon Irish and European statutory instruments, 
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however the addition of other jurisdictions legislative and governance polices on data 
protection, particularly of health information, will be of assistance at stages. 
2.3 Data protection legislation in Ireland 
There are a number of definitions and terms the understanding of which are important 
in the context of this study. The Data Protection Commissioner’s document: Data 
Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 A Guide For Data Controllers, (Data Protection 
Commissioner, 2011), provides a very useful list of definitions, and is the most clear 
and helpful that could be found for the purposes of this study. The terms and 
definitions from this document are reproduced in appendix item A so they may be 
understood when they are used further in this document.  
 
The Data Protection Commissioner has also outlined 8 rules that must be adhered to 
when processing personal data. 
 
1. Obtain and process information fairly 
2. Keep it only for one or more specified, explicit and lawful purposes 
3. Use and disclose it only in ways compatible with these purposes 
4. Keep it safe and secure 
5. Keep it accurate, complete and up-to-date 
6. Ensure that it is adequate, relevant and not excessive 
7. Retain it for no longer than is necessary for the purpose or purposes 
8. Give a copy of his/her personal data to an individual, on request 
 
Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 A Guide For Data Controllers, (2011) 
 
The Data Protection Commissioner also states: 
 
“Access to any personal data within an organisation to be restricted to 
authorised staff on a ‘need-to-know’ basis in accordance with a defined policy” 
 
Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 A Guide For Data Controllers, (2011) 
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This is of particular importance for small medical practices where distinctions between 
the levels of access that different staff should have may not be well defined. The 
question must be asked, should a secretary or member of staff who is a receptionist  
needs direct access to patient health information have access to patient private health 
information and what internal governance is required by small medical practices? 
2.3.1  Status of health data for data protection matters 
The difficulty of understanding this field by small medical practices is compounded 
because health information is regarded as being especially sensitive under the 
framework and the Data Protection (Amendment), 2003, defines sensitive personal 
data to include data about a data subject’s health. 
 
“‘sensitive personal data’ means personal data as to—…  the physical or 
mental health or condition or sexual life of the data subject” 
 
Data Protection (Amendment), 2003 
 
In fact the directive completely exclude’s the processing of health information except 
under certain specific circumstances 
 
“The processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and of 
data concerning health or sex life, are prohibited” 
 
EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection) 
 
Except under the following circumstances 
 
“required for the purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the 
provision of care or treatment or the management of health-care services, and 
where those data are processed by a health professional subject to the 
obligation of professional secrecy or by another person also subject to an 
equivalent obligation of secrecy” 
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EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection) 
 
2.3.2  Small Medical Practice internal governance structures 
The concept of internal governance is supported by The Irish College of General 
Practitioners and the National General Practice Information Technology Group, 
(2003), which, when discussing an information management document for medical 
practices states: “Appropriate arrangements should also be in place to govern access 
by administrative staff in fulfilment of their duties within the team”. 
 
Further stimulus for this concept is added: 
 
“Controllers of medical files should, in accordance with domestic law, draw up 
appropriate internal regulations which respect the related principles in this 
recommendation” 
 
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers. Recommendation No. R (97) 5 of 
the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Medical 
Data. 
 
In addition to this the recommendation there is impetuous to have a sole individual 
formally appointed with responsibility for the security of the information systems and 
data protection where such system pertains to medical data. 
 
There is further impetuous to consider the control of access to medical data within a 
small medical practice and to formalize the process by which such access is granted. 
 
“Access to any personal data within an organisation to be restricted to 
authorised staff on a ‘need-to-know’ basis in accordance with a defined policy” 
 
Data Protection Commissioner, (Unknown). 
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Responsibilities are thus placed upon small medical practices in relation to the PHI and 
medical data that they store and process. It would be recommended that such practices 
have formalized information and data protection policy document for internal 
governance purposes that encompasses such matters. 
 
2.3.3  Staff training and contractual requirements 
When discussing an information policy document it is recommended: 
 
“that it include specific provision for staff training and education in relation to 
data protection law and confidentiality” (When talking about an information 
policy document) 
 
The Irish College of General Practitioners and the National General Practice 
Information Technology Group, (2003) 
 
The training of staff in relation to data protection concerns of medical data and PHI in 
small medical practices is a matter to take seriously. With the access that staff have to 
the sensitive personal health information that resides within small medical practices 
there is need for special care to be taken of it. This can necessitate that staff receive 
specific training and instruction in the matter of confidentiality of patient records and 
the data protection requirements for medical data, this can be include “an overview of 
the importance of patient confidentiality”, ICGP/GPIT Data Protection Working Group. 
(2011). 
 
There have been examples of when sufficient observation of such requirements was 
not paid, for example, 
 
“In the case of Isis Machado mentioned earlier, she was charged and fined 
under HIPAA for disclosing individually identifiable medical records” 
 
Johnson, (2009) 
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It is not possible to speculate if better training would have prevented this instance of a 
data breach, but what can be commented upon was that under HIPAA there were 
repercussions for such a breach. In the context of small medical practices, when 
examining their requirements form an internal perspective, while the relevant 
legislation may provide the impetuous for protecting the medical data, the medical 
practice will require its own tools and mechanisms to help ensure staff are not 
responsible for data breaches. 
 
To this end the ICGP/GPIT Data Protection Working Group, (2011), recommend that 
practices “Ensure confidentiality clause is present in staff contracts”. This provides the 
practice with a tool with which to enforce the requirement upon staff to ensure and 
maintain the confidentiality of the medical data that the practice is entrusted with. 
2.3.4  Requirements for technical and procedural controls to access PHI 
In order to maintain the security of the systems and services in small medical practices 
strong passwords are recommended, (General Practice Information Technology Group, 
2008). In addition each user should have their own individual logon credentials that 
provide them access to the necessary systems and data, and those credentials should 
not be shared with other staff of the practice. 
 
Locum doctors pose a particular problem. Locums are doctors that cover during 
another doctor’s absence and can be in a practice on a short term and irregular manner. 
They will require access to the practices systems and medical data to facilitate their 
treatment of patients and such access is considered to be appropriate, (ICGP/GPIT 
Data Protection Working Group, 2011). In order for locums to access the practice 
systems they will need logon details, as with other staff it would be best if they were 
given their own unique logon credentials. In addition locums should be afforded “the 
opportunity to become familiar with practice guidelines for clinicians on use of the IT 
system”, Department of Health & Royal College of General Practitioners, (2005). 
 
The matter of staff joining and leaving the practice also needs to be handled by small 
medical practices to ensure their ability to control access to the medical data that they 
are charged with protecting. Recommendations include, “A user registration and 
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removal policy should be put in place”, General Practice Information Technology 
Group, (2008). This would entail procedures to remove the access to the practice 
systems from a user who has left the practice, by changing the password for their 
account or removing their account for example. Also, when a new member of staff 
joins they need to be facilitated with access to the systems they require but the level of 
access they require should be closely controlled so that they receive only what they 
need to do to perform their role. 
2.3.5  Physical file protections 
Small Medical Practices will still have some amount of paper-based records, referral 
letters for patients for example. This matter poses two problems for the small medical 
practices to solve. 
 
Firstly while the paper records are being retained and stored it is necessary to do so in 
a secure manner, for example there should be no access for members of the public the 
room where the files are stored and the filing cabinet that they are stored in should be 
kept locked when not in use, (General Practice Information Technology Group, 2008). 
 
Secondly, when the need to retain the paper records has passed they should be 
disposed of in such a way that retains the confidentiality of the information contained 
within them. One solution to that is to shred them and a cross cut shredder is 
recommended in some guides, e.g. (National General Practitioner Information 
Technology Group, 2009). 
2.3.6  Additional policies required 
There is no specific timeframe specified for the retention of medical data by small 
medical practices, (ICGP/GPIT Data Protection Working Group, 2011), but the same 
source also lists some related guidelines. It would be good practice for practices to 
consider the amount of time that they retain their medical data for. If they decide not to 
implement a specific timeframe after which the data would be expunged then they 
should continue their efforts to protect the data and ensuring its confidentiality. If the 
decision is taken to expunge data after a period of time, robust practices would be 
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required for the destruction of both physical paper based records and any electronic 
records that are to be destroyed. 
 
Under the Data Protection Act, (1988), data subjects have the right to access the data 
that is stored on them. This means that should a data subject of a practice request a 
copy of the data that the medical practice retains on them the practice is obliged to 
facilitate the request, with the exception of some circumstance’s, such as disclosure of 
the records posing a risk to the physical or mental well being of the data subject, for 
matters of national security. 
 
If such a request is received there is an onus on the medical practice to maintain the 
confidentiality of the data subject, e.g. the data should only be provided to the patient 
in question, it should not be provided to another party unless there are exceptional 
circumstances for such, to a parent or guardian for example. Such matters can be 
complex, thus it would be beneficial if the practice were to formalise the process for 
these requests, while keeping in mind that each request will be different and will have 
to be treated on its own merits. 
2.4 Technical responsibilities and guidance 
Neither the Data Protection Act, 1988, nor the Data Protection (Amendment), 2003 
mention the word’s technical, technology or computer in their text. Considering that it 
was the information age we live in and that much of the data that is to be protected will 
be stored in an electronic, digital form this is surprising. How are organisations and 
companies working with such important personal data expected to protect the data with 
which they are entrusted when it is stored digitally? 
 
Here the EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection) goes further with Article 17, which 
outlines measures for the security of processing private data. 
 
“Member States shall provide that the controller must implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against 
accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized 
disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the 
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transmission of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of 
processing. 
Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their implementation, such 
measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented 
by the processing and the nature of the data to be protected” 
 
EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection) 
 
There are no specific recommendations or requirements in regard the state of the art of 
technology that should be used to protect the data in question. This situation is echoed 
in Room, (2008), which explains that specific guidance on such matters is not given by 
the United Kingdoms Data Protection Act of 1998 and the only technology identified 
by the act is encryption. 
 
Yet, perhaps this vague statement of the technical guidelines and the flexibility it lends 
is more appropriate given the nature of technological change, in particular to security 
related mechanisms such as encryption. For example the Data Protection Act, 1988, 
could had specified the use of DES3 standard encryption for the protection of health 
information, which would have been reasonable since DES was the standard for such 
protection at the time. The Act would have needed to be revised after the successful 
brute force breaking of the DES standard in Verser, (1997). 
 
Interpretation of “appropriate technical measures” however may be difficult, 
particularly when this task has to be performed by a person who does not have the 
relevant technical expertise to understand the state of the art within the field. This is a 
problem area for small medical practices, who typically will not have a member of 
staff with such expertise. 
 
When you contrast the EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection) with article 3 of the EU 
Directive 1999/5/(Radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment), 
                                                
3 Data Encryption Standard (DES), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-
3/fips46-3.pdf, last accessed 28th of March 2011. 
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which clearly outlines some absolute minimum requirements of the technologies 
governed, a clear difference is visible.  
 
It must be noted that the EU Directive 1999/5/(Radio equipment and 
telecommunications terminal equipment) is a far more technically orientated document 
and deals with a subject matter that is specifically a technical one. This differs from 
EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection), a more abstract and procedural based document, 
the what to achieve of the EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection), in contrast to the how 
to achieve it of the EU Directive 1999/5/(Radio equipment and telecommunications 
terminal equipment). Yet the aim is still the same, the safe guard of community 
citizens rights, either that of privacy or of economic prosperity, which was the main 
factor behind the EU Directive 1999/5/(Radio equipment and telecommunications 
terminal equipment). Further, surely every citizens right to privacy is at least equal to 
that of their right to economic prosperity and hence at least the community should 
provide a similar amount of guidance on how that right could be protected? 
2.5 Difficulties and requirements originating from data 
protection legislation 
To take an extreme example, an event organiser could be legitimately in possession of 
information on the dietary requirements of guests attending the event. It is possible that 
such dietary requirements indicate health information on an individual if such a person 
is identifiable from such information and information in regards allergies or other 
nutritional requirements are included. Within the strict wording of the directive such a 
person may be contravention of the directive if that person is not a health care 
professional. 
 
Further, it demonstrates that another person, unrelated to the running of the event 
therefore should not have access to such information without the specific consent of 
the data subject’s in question if the Data Protection Directive is to be taken to the 
extreme.  
 
This highlights the very difficult position that medical practices are in when personal 
data is retained, the information they will store is much more sensitive and plentiful. 
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2.5.1  Requirement for practices to register with the Data Protection 
Commissioner  
Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (European Treaty Series, No. 108) stipulates that health 
data may not be processed unless appropriate domestic law provides safeguards for 
such. Irish law requires that data controllers that process health related personal data 
register with the Data Protection Commissioner. These include medical practices: 
 
“The following categories of data controller are required to register with the 
Data Protection Commissioner if they hold or process personal data on 
computer… Health professionals processing personal data related to mental or 
physical health.” 
 
The Data Protection Commissioner. (2011). REGISTRATION 
CLASSIFICATION & GUIDANCE NOTES FOR APPLICATION 
 
Thus, small medical practices are required to register with the Data Protection 
Commissioner unless “where such data is processed within the terms of a code of 
practice approved by each House of the Oireachtas under section 13 of the Data 
Protection Act 1988”. 
2.6 Applying the data protection governance environment to the 
surveyed small medical practices 
This is obviously a complex and broad area with a considerable amount written about 
it and it is necessary to be able to better understand these matters to examine the 
implications they will have on the area of small medical practices, which is under 
investigation. Further, the legislative and governance framework that applies to such 
area’s are not the natural territory for the administrative and medical staff that work in 
small medical practices nor is it the natural territory for the IT staff who operate there. 
 
This project intends to assess the level of data protection and computer security in 
small medical practices. This will be done by conducting interviews with key 
stakeholders in those practices. 
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This leads to the necessity to try and simplify the complex area so that such staff and 
researchers can both more easily understand the state of processes and procedures in 
place in medical practices in relation to data protection, while still maintaining the 
goals and requirements set out in the regulatory framework. Method of modelling or 
examining the state of data protection in medical practices would be useful for this 
purpose. 
2.6.1  Data protection checklist for small medical practices 
To this end a short checklist has been created to help model and understand the 
problem domain of data protection in small medical practices. This checklist should 
not be considered a fool-proof way to guarantee the data protection of medical data in 
such practices; such an item is beyond the limited scope of this project. It instead 
intends to provide a mechanism to base the interview section of the project on to help 
understand the state of data protection in the surveyed practices. 
 
1. Register with the Data Protection Commissioner as a data processor of health 
data. 
 
2. Define an information management policy for who needs access to health 
information and how that access is governed. Consider whether administrative 
staff should be able to access patient information to the same extent that 
medical staff can, and if they do require such access to what extent do they 
need to access it. 
 
3. Ensure that access to computer equipment password protected and that screens 
are locked when staff are not using their computers. Ensure that users do no 
share usernames and passwords. 
 
4. Implement a strong password strength policy and a password change policy. 
 
5. Have a procedure in place for when locum doctors need access to your systems 
and record when such access is granted. 
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6. Have a procedure for when new staff joins to set them up with access to the 
health information. Also have a procedure in place for when staff leave the 
practice. 
 
7. Appoint a designated person responsible for security and for periodic review of 
the measures and practices in place. Establish a procedure for how often such 
reviews should take place. 
 
8. In respect of physical files: 
Have a procedure for the secure destruction of sensitive paper records, e.g. use 
a shredder. 
Control and restrict physical access to paper records with the use of locked 
filing cabinets or rooms 
 
9. Ensure staff members are trained in security and data protection matters and 
made aware of their responsibilities. 
 
10. Ensure all persons in the practice (not already covered by a professional 
confidentiality code) have signed a confidentiality agreement that explicitly 
makes clear their duties in relation to personal health information and the 
consequences of breaching that duty. 
 
11. Implement a data retention policy, i.e. how long to maintain records on patients 
for. This will require a defined policy on retention periods for all items of 
personal data kept in addition to management, clerical and computer 
procedures in place to implement such a policy. 
 
12. Implement a data subject access request process. This is when a patient or 
another person or body requests access to patient records. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced and broached the legal frameworks that exist in relation to 
data protection for small medical practices, while it is not possible to cover the entire 
gambit of the regulatory and legislative framework, it is hoped an adequate 
representation of the of the area of data protection in the context the medical practices 
has been achieved, with particular focus on some important points that effect the 
practices, particularly from the perspective of the confidentiality of the medical data 
that they protect. 
 
From this a checklist has been created that will help both the practices understand the 
state of data protection from the confidentiality view point in their environment and 
this checklist will also help drive the data protection portion of the primary research 
for this project. 
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3 COMPUTER SECURITY FOR SMALL MEDICAL 
PRACTICES 
3.1 Introduction 
The legal imperative to protect the Personal Health Information, (PHI), that applies to 
small medical practices has been detailed in the previous chapter. What remains to be 
done is to examine the state of the art for computer security in relation to small 
medical practices. The nature of the systems utilised by small medical practices in 
Ireland is important, much of the literature applies to larger institutions and 
organisations, while such literature is still valid and important, a special focus on what 
applies to small medical practices is also required. 
3.2 Computer Security Overview 
3.2.1  Computer Security Objectives 
The common goals of computer security are commonly regarded to be confidentiality, 
integrity and availability, (Aceituno, 2005). Where confidentiality is regarded as the 
intention that certain information is only available to certain authorised users and 
processes, integrity is the ensuring that the information being stored and processed is 
accurate and truly reflects the state of the data in question and availability ensures that 
the data is available to the users and processes who have a legitimate requirement to 
access it when they require such access. 
 
In (Aceituno, 2005), the use of a set of security measures to define security is 
debunked when comparing the use of a bicycle lock to secure a bike in the English 
countryside as opposed to Mogadishu. This is an important concept to understand from 
the perspective of computer security. Measures can be taken to protect any system or 
item of worth, but those measures are relative to the worth of the asset to be protected 
and the security environment in which it resides. 
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3.2.2  The importance of the protection of medical data in small medical 
practices 
Taking the protection of PHI in small medical practices, the General Practice 
Information Technology Group, (2008), when discussing the loss of existing 
information technology assets in General Practice surgeries the authors, who are 
themselves General Practitioners, state “If you have no data, you have no business”. 
Also the potential for the loss of trust from patients of their GP if the confidentiality of 
that data is compromised could have negative consequences for the GP’s business as 
well as the patient’s state of mind. 
 
The assumption is that the medical data that small medical practice retains is an asset, 
which needs to be protected, and the measures used to protect that data must be 
consistent with the risk or potential risk that the data is at. 
3.2.3   Approaches to providing security 
Tulu & Chatterjee, (2003), present a general security model for Trusted Third Party 
Services, (TTP). A TTP is a body that facilities communication between two systems 
or parties who both trust the third party which allows the originating and receiving 
parties in the communication to trust each other.  The security model emphasises 
application security on the part of the communicating parties and communication 
security between them and the TTP, it is similar in some aspects to the Bell – LaPadula 
model, (Bell & LaPadula, 1973), whereby moving between secure states it is possible 
to retain the security of a system and the confidentiality within it. The paradigm does 
not have to apply only to TTP based communication of a global scale where diverse 
systems from multiple organisations are communicating with each other. The same 
model’s, moving between secure states, achieved via utilisation of application security 
at the endpoints and communication security to facilitate the data transfer can be 
applied within a small network or even within single system. 
 
If a small medical practice is to use computer systems that communicate with each 
other then this approach can help to protect the confidentiality within those systems. It 
can also provide scale, differing levels and layers of protections can be built into the 
overall security model whereby application and communication security are employed 
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to transition between secure states within the same or differing systems. Tulu & 
Chatterjee, (2003), then move on to apply the security model to the security rule of 
HIPAA, a hybrid framework for securing HIPAA protected data is developed that 
addresses the technical and organisation issues faced with HIPAA compliance. An 
eight-stage process is outlined to make an organisation HIPAA complaint should it 
wish to become so. While HIPAA does not apply within the context of small medical 
practices in Ireland, a framework that is intended to achieve such compliance is 
relevant as it may have commonality with requirements under Irish data protection 
legislation. However in the case of Tulu & Chatterjee’s framework, while it is a useful 
tool it is somewhat abstracted and conceptualised for application by small medical 
practices in Ireland. The detail of what exactly needs to be done and how to approach it 
to maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of medical data is lacking. 
3.2.4  Computer Security Models 
In order to understand how to achieve security for an organisation and what measures 
need to be taken to protect the information and the systems that store and process that 
information for the organisation an overall view of how to view and model the 
concepts behind the specifics of applying security will be beneficial to understanding 
the problem domain. 
 
A security Architecture blueprint, (Peterson, 2006), which moves from stakeholder 
goals to provide assurance by streaming security services into differing self supporting 
streams that help to provide a layered, in-depth defence for information assets. It 
defines security architecture as: 
 
“Security architecture: unifying framework and reusable services that 
implement policy, standards, and risk management decisions. The security 
architecture is a strategic framework that allows the development and 
operations staff to align efforts, in addition the security architecture can drive 
platform improvements which are not possible to make at a project level” 
 
Peterson, (2006) 
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It also outlines processes such as software development lifecycles and vulnerability 
management that are key to assurance. Each process and defence measure is 
categorised into a separate but interdependent layer that will help to achieve security. 
To provide a defence in depth all such measures are self supporting and exist in a 
holistic environment where the total of the parts working together is greater than the 
sum of the individual protections. 
 
In Stoneburner, (2001), the security objectives of availability, integrity, confidentiality 
and accountability are detailed and the notion that once all four of those have been met 
assurance will be achieved. A security services model, which takes the approach of 
using key foundations of security such as identification and system protections, i.e. 
least privilege and process separation to provide a mechanism whereby the user of a 
system has their access to the resources controlled via authentication and authorisation, 
among other methods, in a secure manner. The model classifies services according to 
their primary role, Support – generic, Prevent – preventing a breach and Recover – 
detection and recovery from breach. 
 
Of particular interest are the components of the model, while no specifics are 
mentioned, resources such as operating system security services are harnessed and 
underlie all distributed services. System security can be no stronger than the 
underlying operating system and the other systems and services around it are 
intertwined from a security point. For an example that could impact a small medical 
practice, a Health Information System, (HIS), could be linked to an email client via 
copying and pasting medical records from the HIS into an email that a user sends to 
themselves. The medical record could then be compromised by malware on a PC that 
opens the email. This illustrates the inter dependent nature of security and the necessity 
for security domains:  
 
“A domain is a set of active entities (person, process, or device), their data 
objects, and a common security policy” 
 
Stoneburner, (2001), 
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Essentially establishing security domains is like building fences between data and 
process flows to impose restrictions between them. This will help to provide assurance, 
which is a key theme that the important information is not at risk. The paper also 
distinguishes between the following, -­‐ Vulnerability’s, which are weaknesses in system security that could be 
exploited and would be a violation of the system’s security policy -­‐ Threat source’s, either accidentally or intentionally triggering the vulnerability -­‐ Threat’s, potential for the ‘threat source’ to be exploited -­‐ Risk – net business impact “probability of occurrence combined with impact” 
The overall context of the risk management process is elaborated on. A typical 
example of how this might progress could be a vulnerability in the operating system of 
server that a small medical practice employs. If the threat source is mitigated by only 
allowing trusted users an computers connect to the server via the local network and 
implementing a firewall that prevents access to the server from the internet then the 
threat is reduced as the potential of the threat source to be exploited is limited. Thus in 
the balance the matter the risk of the vulnerability to the medical practice is reduced. 
3.2.5  Enterprise Information Security Architecture 
Enterprise Architecture is a method by which an organisations Information 
Technology assets and procedures are aligned with the core mission and operational 
characteristics of the business, National Institute of Health Enterprise Architecture, 
(2008). Changes from the security perspective have been made to this approach, 
“Information security was recently incorporated into EA as enterprise information 
security architecture (EISA)”, Oda et al, (2009), which profiles Enterprise Security 
Information Architectures, lists them and provides their chronology. 
 
The four concepts of business, information, technology and security architectures, are 
introduced and importance and use of abstraction is explained, “The common levels of 
abstraction used in the three frameworks mentioned earlier are conceptual, logical, 
and implementation level”. This provides a hierarchical conceptual model by which to 
understand EISA and how to apply it. In addition EISA frameworks such as the 
SABSA method are explained. The SABSA method is is a methodology for EISA, that 
aims to ensure that security services for a business are designed, delivered and 
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supported as an integral part of the businesses governance and operations. Some case 
studies are also presented. 
 
“The SABSA method is used in organizations such as the Centre for Medicare 
Services (a.k.a. Health Care Financing Administration), which is a governing 
party of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)” 
 
Oda et al, (2009) 
 
Another EISA example is ISO IEC 27799 2005 – Information technology — Security 
techniques — Code of practice for information security management. This ISO 
standard outlines why information security is needed and what needs to be done to 
achieve it from a high level. It is a broad document that encompasses many of the 
area’s that need to be worked on to achieve information technology security. For 
example it includes human resource security measures like the use of contracts to 
protect and organisations information. From the perspective of small medical practices 
this is important for administrative staff as outlined in the previous chapter. 
Administrative staff will not be covered by professional standards and practices and 
require an additional mechanism to ensure their compliance with information security 
practices. 
 
The ISO also mandates such matters ranging from physical and environmental security 
management like restricting physical access to information technology assets to the 
establishment of incident response procedures. 
 
From the perspective of small medical practices the standard outlines how to establish 
security requirements, assess the risk to the organisation including any legal 
frameworks when taking into consideration the principles and objectives that the 
organisation has developed for itself. Risk Assessment will then help guide the 
business and aid in selecting the necessary risk controls. Risk assessment must consist 
of both risk analysis, the process of discovery and classification of risk, and risk 
evaluation, the estimation of the significance of the risk. There is an implied trade-off 
to ne made, the ISO states that there is a need to “balance the investment in 
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implementation and operation of controls against the harm likely to result from 
security failures”, (ISO IEC 27799 2005).  
 
From the point of view of a small medical practice this is important, there are risks 
inherent in storing and maintaining electronic records for patients but perspective is 
required, this is similar to what was argued in the previous chapter in relation to data 
protection for medical data where it was stated that, “measures shall ensure a level of 
security appropriate to the risks”, EU Directive 95/46 (Data Protection). There is a 
further caveat to this though, such measures and practices are not 100% guaranteed to 
ensure the protection of such data and, 
 
“It should be kept in mind that no set of controls can achieve complete security, 
and that additional management action should be implemented to monitor, 
evaluate, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of security controls to 
support the organization’s aims”  
 
ISO IEC 27799 2005 
 
This is high-level material without anything practical, it is what to do as opposed to 
how to do it. For example, in section 10.9 of ISO IEC 27799 2005, protection of 
electronic commerce assets is mandated but no particulars as to how to do that are 
available, e.g. there is no mention of the requirement to apply security patches to a 
MySQL database if that is where the electronic commerce data is to be stored or using 
encryption at the application layer when electronic commerce services communicate 
with clients. 
 
This is similar to the other EA security frameworks reviewed as they are are high level 
approaches for large organisations with multiple layers of management, what is needed 
for small medical practices is different, they require something more focussed and 
applied that is easy to understand and implement to start with. For example the NSA 
has recommended that for home networks, are similar to the small networks that small 
medical practices may use, install Windows 7 or Vista instead of Windows XP, 
(National Security Agency, 2011). 
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3.3 Security in relation to Health Information Systems 
3.3.1  Definitions of health data related systems 
Small medical practice may use some class of Health Information System, (HIS), or 
Electronic Health Record, (EHR), system’s to maintain and manage their patient 
records. An EHR system is a record for patient medical histories maintained over time, 
HIMMS, (Unknown). While a HIS is different in that it may not necessarily focus 
solely on patient records like EHR systems do and the HIS can include other line of 
business functions such as billing or appointment scheduling. A HIS and can be 
defined as: 
 
“A system that provides information management features that hospitals need for 
daily business Features Pt tracking, billing and administrative programs; may 
include clinical features” 
 
McGraw-Hill Concise Dictionary of Modern Medicine, (2002) 
 
For the purposes of this project there will be no distinction made between a HIS or a 
EHR system, they are both being regarded as containing the same sensitive medical 
data that must be protected as per data protection legislation. 
 
These systems are obviously major stores of PHI and medical data and as such they 
warrant a special investigation as to the state of the art for protecting them. 
3.3.2  Security models for HIS and EHR systems 
In Blobel and Roger-France, (2001), object orientated techniques, including the use of 
UML Use Case diagrams, were developed to create a layered security model for 
analysis of secure health information systems. This is an interesting approach as it 
introduces common object orientated software design principles and practices to the 
area of data protection for small medical practices and holds the potential to enable IT 
professionals and non IT staff working in the area to better understand the area of data 
protection. 
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A “Layered security model based on a concepts–services–mechanisms–algorithms 
view” is presented. It defines the security domain as having shared security policies for 
the systems in question and different levels of granularity are used. Again, as per Tulu 
& Chatterjee, (2003), differentiation between communication security, commonly 
identification and authorisation, and application security, typically authorisation and 
access control, is drawn, but the security elements that make up each domain, such as 
DES, MD5, encryption, share commonality between the two and are each repeated in 
the communication and application security domains.  
 
This shows the mutual nature of such protection mechanisms, their use can be repeated 
across varying domains and there is a limited set of security mechanisms, such as 
encryption provided by the AES algorithm, transport security provided by certificate 
usage such as is employed in TLS and SSL systems. In addition, the repeat of their use 
provides defence in depth and a layered security model through their repeated usage. 
Blobel and Roger-France, (2001), go on to list the security services provided by 
protocols on different ISO-OSI model layers. 
3.3.3  Non technical processes required in relation to security of Health 
Information 
Kenisberg, et al, (2004), deal with Electronic protected health information (ePHI), and 
stipulate that there should be an institutional plan which acts as a reference, assigning 
roles and responsibilities as well as authority where necessary to ensure the protection 
of the electronic health information. They state that such a,  
 
“at minimum, should explain the method of organization or governance, 
reporting mechanism, and training component” 
 
Kenisberg, et al, (2004), 
 
In order to ensure HIPAA compliance, it is necessary to have an organisational process 
as opposed to static implementation of the requirements as interconnected elements 
require governance. This can have an impact on small medical practices as there may 
be a number of interconnected practices and processes that are important to manage to 
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ensure the security of the medical data that the practice maintains. For example, 
assigning user roles to administrative staff that limit them to only the level of access 
they require to perform their job, coupled with a policy that prevents the sharing of 
usernames and passwords to prevent a “side door” of access to a system that such staff 
should not have access or a particular form of access to. It is necessary to look on such 
matters from a “big picture” viewpoint, instead of looking at the individual matters at 
hand, there instead needs to be an overall strategy and awareness of the need for 
protection of the sensitive medical data. 
 
In order to achieve this ePHI must first be uncovered and the repositories in which it 
resides identified. For example does such data exist in cross organisation applications 
such as a HIS or EHR, or does it exist in single files on workstations? If time is 
pressing a number of starting questions are listed to determine the level of what needs 
to be done to achieve HIPAA compliance. 
 
What assets need protection? 
What vulnerabilities exist in the environment? 
What is an acceptable risk level? 
What controls are necessary to ensure adequate and appropriate (specifically, 
reasonable) security? 
What sort of regular schedule should be created for testing, auditing, and 
documenting? 
Is the incident management procedure sufficient? 
What does protection failure mean?  
How much protection can the institution afford? 
 
Kenisberg, et al, (2004), 
 
There are a number of area’s that could represent particular problems to the area of 
data protection in small medical practices. If for example PHI were to be transferred 
across the Internet there would be requirements for particular security technologies to 
be used to help protect such information, for example RADIUS, IPSec and or SSL 
VPN services. In Gritzalis et al, (2005), a wide ranging series of technical guidelines 
for data protection in medical environments is presented. The depth of such protections 
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varies from user specific measures such as limiting the use of use of email distribution 
lists, to more technical matters like support for the mentioned security measures of 
RADIUS and VPN by internet service providers and the use of contractual obligations 
to manage such providers. 
 
The application to small medical practices of what is discussed in Gritzalis et al, 
(2005), is important and it also displays the disparity of protection measures necessary 
on their part. Simple matters such as the use of the wrong email distribution list could 
put medical data at risk. All the way up to the N tier architectures being secured, i.e. 
the data base server and web server for a distributed HIS being secured. The wide 
range of necessary protections necessary for small medical practices can not be over 
stated, once medical data is in a digital format there are far more avenues for it to 
escape from the intended state it was designed to be in.  
3.3.4  Understanding the security available in HIS and EHR systems 
HIS systems are software that require a particular examination of their security 
attributes due to the nature of the data they process, in Blobel et al, (1999), modelling 
of users security needs is undertaken using UML again and the different types of 
security related use cases are mapped out, such as the access control and user 
authentication use cases. These are components of any system that requires granulated 
access levels to the data contained in the system. From this an abstract security model 
for the design and development of systems that manage and store health records which 
has system security requirements identified and designed into it from the start. This 
will be of particular use for software developers and possibly systems integrationists. 
 
While understanding the mechanisms used to secure applications and systems is 
important, it will not always be possible to gain the access to the source code necessary 
to be able to delve into the detail required to determine if such security practices have 
been implemented. Blobel, (2004), discusses authorisation and access control for 
electronic health record systems, particularly for integration between differing 
organisations EHR and HIS systems. While such a scenario of integrated, cross 
organisation systems is unlikely to effect small medical practices that exist in a state 
more in akin to a sole trader and do not have such inter-dependences and links with 
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other organisations so that their HIS systems are directly linked to another’s, the 
methods used to understand policy definition, agreements, authorisation and access 
control between such systems can be harnessed for the use of small medical practices 
to better understand the protections built in to their HIS systems. To such an end, 
Blobel, (2004), mentions the Health Informatics standards that Blobel has contributed 
to, ISO TC 215 Health Informatics, which deals with matters of interoperability 
between health informatics systems.  
3.3.5  Standards available for securing health information systems 
ISO TC 215 was not the only such standard discussed in Blobel, (2004), CEN EN 
13606 and HL 7 were also mentioned and there are other similar efforts that are not 
focussed entirely on the security of health information systems that merit some review. 
 
Two of the main organizations that administer standards related to HIS and EHR 
systems include Health Level 7, (HL7) and Comite Europeen de Normalization – 
Technical Committee (CEN TC), as per (The MITRE Corporation, 2006). Much of the 
work in regards the formulation of standards for interoperability of health information 
systems is underway, particularly in Europe. 
 
“The main focus of EHR communications standardisation is presently 
occurring at a European level, through the Committee for European 
Normalisation (CEN). The major constructs of the CEN 13606 model are 
outlined. Complementary activity is taking place in ISO and in HL7”  
 
Kalra, (2006) 
 
The HL 7 Security initiative state that: 
 
 “This group supports the HL7 mission to create and promote its standards by 
publishing standards for trustworthy communication among all applications 
and services in HL7s scope. The Security TC also will lead the convergence 
and harmonization of standards for identity and access management among 
healthcare standards development organizations” 
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Health Level Seven International, (2005) 
 
This is supported by CEN 13606 - Health informatics, where part 4 of the European 
standard deals with security and defines measures to support access control, consent 
and auditability of EHR communications, (Kalra, 2006). 
 
Further ISO 27799:2008 specifies detailed guidelines and best practises to maintain the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of personal health information, (ISO 
27799:2008). The standard is very detailed when outlining what needs to be done to 
help ensure the information security management for health data is adhered to, for 
example it mandates: 
 
“Organizations that process personal health information should take sensible 
steps to ensure that the public are only as close to IT equipment (servers, 
storage devices, terminals and displays) as physical constraints and clinical 
processes demand” 
 
ISO 27799:2008 
 
However, while this level of detail is achieved for such matters it still does not 
elaborate on the specific technical tasks that are required to ensure that the health 
information is secured. 
3.3.6  Application development standards for non Health Information 
specific systems 
The standards discussed so far can be useful in identifying systems and software that 
meet the stringent requirements necessary to ensure that the health information that 
small medical practices store and process is adequately protected. Yet, if a system does 
not have certification from one of those standards organisations, that does not 
necessarily mean that the system in insecure. There are other standards in relation to 
the development of software in a secure manner that can be used to determine if it has 
been developed securely, some of these standards will be discussed here. 
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The OWASP Guide Project’s, (OWASP Guide Project, 2011), intention is to help 
developers of websites and web applications develop such applications in a secure 
manner. They state “secure applications cost about the same to develop as insecure 
applications, but are far more cost effective in the long run”. If this is true it is a strong 
argument for such development methodologies, particularly if a small medical practice 
were to be interested in the implementation of such a system, say for example they 
wished to sue a system that could display available appointment times online. Such a 
system would need to integrate with their existing appointment management system 
and if access to PHI were possible or even potentially possible OWASP 
implementation standards would help allay any fears they may have about exposing 
the PHI to an increased threat. 
 
In addition, if a HIS or EHR system that the small medical practice used was a web 
application, such a development methodology could be used in the construction of the 
web application, further security mechanisms would be recommended at that stage, 
such as ensuring there were no direct access between the internet and the web 
application. 
 
The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle Process, (Microsoft, Unknown), 
includes foundation concepts such as secure design by reducing the attack surface of 
the application, the principle of least privilege and defence in depth. It also mandates 
practices such as Fuzz testing and security reviews. The development lifecycle lays out 
a step-by-step guide to writing and developing secure applications and as it emanates 
from the Microsoft environment is of particular use to any applications that are 
developed for use with Microsoft systems. 
 
For small medical practices this is important if they are to purchase health information 
systems that will be run on a Microsoft Server Operating System and accessed by 
Microsoft Client Operating Systems. Software that is developed to the Microsoft 
Security Development Lifecycle Process will provide a level of assurance for the 
protection of that software. 
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The standards of application development laid out above will have common secure 
coding techniques throughout them and there are some things when developing 
software that can be done to increase the security of that software, such as validating 
input, avoiding buffer over flows and checking code manually as opposed to with an 
integrated development environment alone as well as with automated tools for security 
flaws, (IT Security Office, Trinity College Dublin, 2005). 
 
The necessity for validating input was highlighted in (McKenzie, 2011), when 
examination of an open source social networking web application developed in Ruby 
would allow any authenticated user the authorization to interact with any other users 
pictures because the object ID that was used for the pictures was not a private object 
and could trivially be guessed by another user. There was no validation of the input 
that a user could enter to ensure that they were authenticated for the action they had 
requested. 
 
The outlined security weaknesses were found because the project was an open source 
one and in some ways this example is an argument for the security of open source 
systems as they allow peer review of their code. This option may not be open to small 
medical practices as they are unlikely to have direct access to the code of a health 
information system that they may purchase off the shelf from a vendor. But asking the 
question about the security reviews that took place during the development of the 
application can aide in determining if the health application had such security matters 
considered when it was being developed, assuming of course that any answer that was 
received was truthful. 
3.3.7  Limitation and overview of standards 
The use such security standards are to be put to within small medical practices for the 
purposes of this project must be understood. It is not assumed for the security model 
that is being developed for this project that if a health application in use in a small 
medical practice does or does not have certification from one of the mentioned 
standards that it is guaranteed to be secure on unsecure as the case maybe. The 
intended use of these standards is as a guide to the security of a health application, 
such standards are not he last word in security. 
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Essentially the standards discussed in this section deal with what could be done with 
the personal health data being stored and processed via the health information systems 
software and applications employed by a small medical practice. The standards 
provide guidance on how to seek assurance that these applications interact with the 
data in a secure manner. 
 
There is more to the eco system of systems a small medical practice may employ than 
just the HIS application that processes the PHI directly, e.g. the network that the data 
passes over or the servers that the HIS run on. There are also recently developed 
security incidents and problems that may influence data protection and security matters 
for health information. 
3.4 Recent Security Problems 
There had been a large number of well-publicised security incidents at the time of the 
writing of this dissertation. These are important to note because they reflect some 
common problems with securing any kind of information system but also because they 
may influence stake holders in health information systems, such as General 
Practitioners and patients as to the level of security that is needed to protect personal 
health information. 
3.4.1  Examples of recent security problems 
These include attacks that exposed the information of millions of users of the Sony 
online gaming network, (Goodin, 2011 - A), because the web servers that the 
information was accessible through were running out of date versions that had well 
documented security vulnerabilities, in addition to the fact that there was no firewall 
running between the servers and the Internet. 
 
Attackers were able to access the account information for 200,000 Citigroup 
customers, (Goodin, 2011 - B), through a common underlying vulnerability in the 
company’s website that was another example of a lack of validating input: 
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“The technique allowed the hackers to leapfrog from account to account on the 
Citi website by changing the numbers in the URLs that appeared after 
customers had entered valid usernames and passwords” 
 
Goodin, (2011 - B) 
 
An alarming, but thankfully subsequently debunked rumour, (Oates, 2011, A), was 
circulated on the Internet that the Lulzsec group had gained access to the UK census 
data. As mentioned the rumour turned out to be without foundation, but possibly the 
more concerning matter was that such a rumour gained credence at all and was not 
immediately dismissed as impossible. 
 
Another example of a serious attack that occurred because of a lack of basic security 
mechanisms was the attack on HBGary Federal, (Bright, 2011), that occurred because 
a password fro one user was obtained through he use of an SQL injection on the 
content management systems for the company’s website yielded a password that was 
re-used for other systems. The SQL injection could have been prevented through 
updating the content management software for the website in question. 
 
Other examples of data breaches include Lockheed Martin suffering a data breach in 
part because of the compromise of the RSA authentication tokens that they used, 
(Goodin, 2011 - C) and (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2011), where a website 
operated on behalf of NATO that ran their online bookstore suffered a breach. 
 
While not an example of an explicit technical failing, (Brook, 2011), details how the 
University of California at Los Angeles Health Services were fined for employees 
gaining access to the health records of celebrities without proper cause. Another 
example of insufficient security of health records related was when the NHS in Britain, 
(Oates, 2011, B), signed undertakings with the Information Commissioners Office to 
improve processes in relation to data security of medical information.  
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3.4.2  Impact of these attacks on securing health information for small 
medical practices 
Thankfully none of the cited examples are examples from small medical practices but 
that does not mean that small practices are immune to such matters. What is of 
particular concern is that there are some common threads of concern between many of 
these examples. 
 
Firstly several of the attacks emanated from the Internet and targeted web servers and 
web applications that stored and processed the information that was lost. Secondly, a 
number of the breaches could have been prevented by implementing simple security 
remediation’s, such as updating software or not re-using passwords between systems, 
they were not that difficult to prevent. 
 
Thus this project will examine more commonplace security mechanisms and 
guidelines that may be applicable to small medical practices in order to mitigate 
against the types of attacks discussed by this section. This requires more applied 
guides and standards for securing common systems and services that may be used in 
small medical practices than have been discussed to date. 
 
Such guides will have more bearing on the foundation and platform on which the 
health information data is stored and processed, such as servers that run health 
information systems and store health data, network devices that communicate health 
information between end points and client computer operating systems that integrate 
with the health information systems. These are systems and services that are likely to 
be used in small medical practices and due to this require some examination. 
3.4.3  Further considerations for the protection of personal health 
information 
Thus far we have examined protection of health data when it is being processed and 
some of the common problems that have publically impacted information technology 
users of late. There are other considerations to take into account for the security of 
health data in small medical practices though. For example we also need look at the 
security of such data when it is stationary within a system and being moved between 
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systems as well as how it gets into any health data repository and what can access it 
when it is there. 
3.5 Security of ancillary systems that provide a platform for 
health information systems 
There are a number of ancillary systems that could connect to a small medical 
practices network and interact with the health information stored their, even if the 
ancillary systems themselves are not the primary repository for the health information. 
These systems provide the foundation and platform upon which the other specifically 
health rolled systems reside and because of this require consideration for the security 
of the network as a whole. 
 
A common client operating system that may be in use in small medical practices is 
Windows XP. Client computers can connect to the practice network and access shared 
IT resources such as a health information service, because of this dependency and the 
fact that it increases the attack surface for the practice network as a whole there is a 
need to ensure that such client operating systems are secure. Practices such as not 
allowing users to have administrative privileges and applying security patches quickly 
after their release are common client security mechanisms, Scarfone et al, (2008, A), 
details these mechanisms and others, such as security template’s, which are text-based 
files containing configurations for security-relevant system settings that can be applied 
across a network of client computers to ensure a common baseline security 
configuration on each. 
 
As client operating systems can be secured, so to can server operating systems and 
small medical practices may employ a server to facilitate shared information 
technology resources such as a HIS.  
 
One example of the guides available is the Windows Server 2003 Security Compliance 
Management Toolkit, (Microsoft, 2009), which provides information about how to 
harden servers running Windows Server 2003. It is a utility that can be run on a server 
which “includes updated security guides, pre-defined group policies, the 
GPOAccelerator tool, and Configuration Packs” Kleef, (2009), to harden the security 
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posture of the server. There are similar guides available for Unix operating systems, 
for example, (AusCERT & CERT/CC, 2001), which while it does not provide an 
automatic way to run the check list it does provide considerable detail on how to 
secure a Unix based operating system. For example much attention is paid to the 
necessity to install software patches, both for the operating system software and for 
any application software running on the server. 
 
Protection of such systems, both Unix and Windows, even if they do not themselves 
store or process health information and even if they are not intended to be able to 
access health information is still important. Such ancillary systems may provide trusted 
services to a small medical practice, such as DNS or directory services, upon which the 
HIS application relies and trusts. General sever security is discussed in (Scarfone et al, 
2008, B), which provides a security policy that can be applied to such servers and is of 
particular interest from a change management perspective and for security planning 
and maintenance of ongoing server security over time. 
 
An area that is of importance for ancillary systems and services that can interact with 
health information systems in a small medical practice is any directory service that is 
running on the network and providing authentication for users of the HIS. Such a 
directory service is in a position of trust on the network; the systems that integrate with 
it have to rely on it to provide secure and reliable authentication services. ISO/TS 
21091:2005. Health informatics -- Directory services for security, communications and 
identification of professionals and patients, deals in particular with these concerns. 
While this standard is more to do with the design of authentication mechanisms for 
health information systems than for the assurance of security of a particular network 
directory service, it still serves to highlight the importance of the matter. 
3.6 Security of medical data when it is at rest 
Data can be at rest in small medical practices when it is not being processed but is 
simply being stored. The confidentiality or availability of the data could be at risk if 
there is no mechanism to ensure its protection, say for example if the storage media 
that the data is at rest on were mislaid or stolen. If such a case were to happen an 
effective way to protect the data would be to encrypt it. One effective encryption 
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standard is the Advanced Encryption Standard, (AES), as per  (NIST, 2001), which 
details the cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect data by turning it into a 
cypher text that can only be read with the key that was used to convert it into a cypher. 
 
Small medical practices can store data on storage devices such as hard disks or 
magnetic tapes. When the storage media is no longer to be used the data on it could 
still be at risk if the data is not destroyed in a secure manner. Procedures for data 
destruction are available as per (NSA, 2000), which include mechanisms such as 
incineration and degaussing to ensure that the confidentially of the persona health 
information is maintained after the storage media the information used to be stored on 
is retired. 
 
Another possible scenario that could place data at risk when it is being stored is if it 
were to be stored in a cloud based storage facility that may place it out of the control of 
the data controller. ENISA, (2009), details a checklist for cloud computing services 
that can be used to seek assurance that the cloud based service is not putting the 
confidentiality, availability or integrity of the data at risk. 
3.7 Security of medical data when it is in transition between 
systems 
Medical data and personal health information in small medical practices has the 
potential move between intern connected systems on a small medical practice 
frequently. Because of this there is a need to apply protections to the data when it is in 
transit and the network over which it transits in order to maintain the confidentiality 
and integrity of the information. 
3.7.1  Network perimeter defense and architecture   
If a small medical practice uses a network to allow its endpoints to communicate with 
each other it will most likely have a perimeter that is connected to the network. Also, 
the internal network needs to be designed and configured in such a way not to put the 
data that passes over the network at risk. In order to aide the understanding of such 
matters and assist the systems and network administrators of small medical practices 
the state of the art in regards network protection will be of use. 
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A checklist to help when “evaluating whether a network is adhering to best practices 
in network security and data confidentiality”, in the form of a security policy is 
available in Alabady, (2009). The paper details issues such as router weaknesses, 
including a list of some attack types and common security policy and configuration 
weaknesses that should be avoided. Firewalls implement a security policy, what traffic 
is allowed to pass into the network is configured and then only traffic that meets the 
policy is allowed to pass through the network. This is relevant because many GP 
offices have a small LAN connected to the Internet and the routers and firewalls that 
are used need to be properly secured. 
 
This policy is of particular benefit for the setup of small medical practice networks as 
it details a total of 20 security mechanisms and best practices that may not always be 
automatically applied to such small networks. Further the policy is mostly vendor 
agnostic, so it will not be limited to one particular brand of equipment, such as Cisco 
or Netgear.  
 
In SANS, (2005), suggestions as how to segment a network for security purposes is 
discussed. A network segment will be defined based on the security level of each 
segment, including remote users and a chapter of the paper is dedicated to the securing 
of remote users via VPN, (Virtual Private Networking). Securing how remote users 
access the network is important for small medical practices as they may allow staff to 
work from home and those staff will likely connect to the practice network via the 
internet. In order to facilitate this some kind of security needs to be applied to the 
mechanism that is used to allow remote users to connect. 
 
Network protection for small medical practices can then be combined with the 
guidelines for firewalls and firewall policy in Scarfone and Hoffman, (2009). This 
guide explains the technologies implemented in firewalls, such as packet filtering and 
network access control and how to utilize them in firewall policy’s and network 
architectures.  
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3.7.2  Wireless network considerations 
Small medical practices may decide to use wireless communication technologies to 
allow communication within the practice. If they do so and particularly if it will be 
possible to gain access to any health information systems from the wireless network, 
they should consider using wireless security protocols to protect the communication on 
the wireless network. 
 
The Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS), as detailed in (Rigney, 
2000), is a networking protocol that manages authentication, authorization and 
accounting for computers that connect to networks, including wireless networks. For 
wireless networks used by small medical practices RADIUS can be used to control the 
users who are permitted access to the wireless network and what network resources 
they may use while connected. 
 
In order to protect the data that passes over the wireless network the 802.1X Wireless 
Standard, (IEEE, 2004), uses the EAPOL protocol to enable encryption between 
segments of the local network, usually between the wireless access point and the 
wireless enabled device that is connecting to the network. in the case of small medical 
practices this would help to maintain the confidentiality of the data transiting the 
wireless network since the data would be encrypted. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter the state of the art for computer security of health information related 
systems and services were discussed. A particular emphasis was placed on security 
from the perspective of small medical practices because the environment in which 
small medical practices operate is different from that of larger organisations such as 
hospitals or similar.  
 
Much of what has been written about securing health information systems pertains to 
large systems that communicate across networks with other complex systems. These 
are complex scenarios, but small medical practices operate different systems in 
different environments. They are more likely to have s small local network with a 
small number of desktop workstations connected to it, with possibly a central file 
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server that have access to email and other standard productivity systems. If they use a 
health information system it is likely to be a small localised one that does not share 
data outside of the network to which it is connected. Much of what pertains to the 
cross organisation environments envisaged for many health information and electronic 
health records systems does not apply to the more limited, smaller scale systems that 
are used in small medical practices. 
 
What is needed to help protect such practices information is understanding of the 
security mechanisms to protect how data can get into the health information repository 
and what systems can interact with the process, what can be done to the data once it is 
in the repository, how it is protected when it is at rest and how it is protected while 
being transported between systems and the repository. 
 
 
 
   60 
4 SECURITY MODEL AND DATA PROTECTION 
FRAMEWORK  
4.1 Introduction 
The challenge for this project is to offer a holistic security approach for a multifaceted 
environment where the key asset to secure is the health information that patients 
entrust to their medical practitioners. This information can reside in a number of 
locations, e.g. within the electronic health record system that their medical provider 
use’s for patient appointment scheduling and record keeping, to a single file on a USB 
key, such as a letter to a fellow medical practitioner, that their doctor has taken home 
to work on later. The important matter here is not the type of method that is used to 
access or store the health data, although that certainly can have a baring on the 
protection applied to the health data, the important matter is the health data itself, that 
is what the patient values and that is what needs to be protected. The question is how 
to protect the sensitive health data from unauthorised access and this question is where 
the matter clouds and becomes difficult to manage due to the complex environment 
that computing can exist in. 
 
This chapter will introduce the technical and procedural security model that is being 
constructed for this project to better understand how to protect the Personal Health 
Information, (PHI), that small medical practices retain and process and how that 
information is currently being protected in the surveyed small medical practices. 
 
This security model will consist of three hierarchical layers, a PHI data classification 
layer, a systems and services classification and examination layer and a security 
measures and resources layer. The data classification layer is the top level of the model 
and it deals with the conceptualised state in which the data exists, e.g. is the data 
residing within a specific health information system or is it travelling between two 
systems. The systems and services classicisation layer corresponds to the system which 
the PHI data is being processed by or stored in and whether or not that systems 
primary purpose is to deal with PHI. The security measures and resources are the 
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actual protections applied to the PHI and corresponding references to ensure a 
compliant security state. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Security Model Overview 
 
These layers will be expanded upon throughout this chapter to aid understanding of the 
security model being constructed. To understand what type of model is needed for this 
project an understanding of the systems that store and process PHI in small medical 
practices will be beneficial. 
4.2 Typical Small Medical Practice Network 
Small medical practice networks will be similar to many other small networks and 
have corresponding systems. The main differences will be in two areas. Firstly the type 
of data that is being stored and processed, such PHI can require more rigorous 
protection than other forms of data, such as timesheets and other office records, which 
while they will contain personal information, timesheets do not also contain medical 
data as PHI does. Secondly a small medical practice may employ a Health Information 
System, (HIS), or Electronic Health Record, (EHR), System, that stores and processes 
the PHI. 
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Figure 4.12: Typical Small Medical Practice Network 
 A typical small medical practice network may be similar to other small office 
networks, will be connected to the Internet through a router that may also be 
performing duties as a firewall, (Shafer, M, 2010). The internal network may have a 
server running a number of services, such as the HIS, email, file sharing. There may 
also be a taped or other backup solution in place. The internal network will then have a 
number of desktop or laptop workstations connected to it to allow the staff of the 
practice use the IT resources. In this instance it is being assumed that the network is a 
wired network only and that no wireless connections are being used, however the 
security model will provide controls and security measures for wireless security. 
 
Such a network may have a number of vulnerabilities associated with it, for instance 
the default configuration including username and password may be left applied to the 
router that is acting as a firewall, or the server running the shared IT services may not 
be fully up to date with operating system security patches.  
 
Either of those scenarios has the potential to expose the personal health information 
stored on the network to the risk of a data breach or other un-authorised access. 
However, they are not the only possible risk, e.g. if taped backups were being used and 
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transferred off site but not encrypted, if they are lost the confidentiality of data they 
contain could be lost, there are multiple risks associated with such a network and a 
more systematic and comprehensive method to assess the security state of the network 
and the PHI that it contains is required. One example of when medical data was lost 
occurred when thieves pilfered backup tapes holding two million medical records,  
(Fonseca, 2008). 
4.3 Approach and perspective of the Security Model 
The approach that will be used for this model is from inside the organisation that uses 
the systems and stores and processes the PHI data. This will be the view from a 
systems administrator and end users perspective, that is to say the people who will be 
responsible for implementing, securing and using the systems not the view of a 
developer or programmer of HIS or EHR software. Nor is it the perspective of a 
penetration tester or other body testing the systems from an external perspective. 
 
This approach is taken because the intent of this project is to investigate the general 
level of data protection from within the small medical practices, not from an external 
stand point. It is not to say that alternate viewpoints are not helpful or valid though, 
simply that the target audience for this model is an internal audience. 
4.4 PHI Data Classification States 
For the purposes of this model there are 3 states or categorisations in which PHI can 
exist within the confines of the systems that small medical practices commonly use. 
 
1. Inside 
2. Outside 
3. Over 
 
Breaking the model into such segments aides in both understanding the problem 
domain and in the interpretation and analysis of the problem domain when compared 
to the model. Instead of having a long list of indicators it is possible to 
compartmentalise the systems and processes that need to be analysed and deal with 
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them separately. It will also make the task of analysing the security state of the practice 
seem more manageable and less daunting. 
 
 
Figure 4.13: PHI Data Classification States, Inside, Outside, Over 
4.4.1  Inside 
For the purposes of this model this is PHI and medical data when it resides in a system 
whose purpose and intention is to process and store PHI data. Essentially this will most 
likely be the Health Information System, (HIS), and or the Electronic Health Records, 
(EHR), System that the small medical practice uses to manage the health information 
of its patients. 
 
However the “inside” categorisation may not apply to HIS and HER software systems 
alone. For example if a practice kept a specific database of medications prescribed to 
patients outside of their HIS, that would also be categorised as an “inside” state as the 
purpose of the database is to store data that is specifically medical in nature and is 
being used for a purpose that is medically related. 
 
The PHI when it is in the state of being “inside” is the primary repository of the 
sensitive medical and health data that the model being constructed intends to help 
secure and protect. Thus those systems have a higher level of risk attached to them if 
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they were to be compromised and require specific attention for the purposes of this 
model. 
 
From the sample small medical practice network outlined in figure 2 of this chapter the 
inside data state would apply to the HIS service running in the GP Practice server. 
4.4.2  Outside 
PHI and medical data is in the “outside” state when it is being stored in or processed 
by a system that is not specifically intended to store or process personal health 
information. There are a varying number of such systems including. 
 
1. File Servers that save referral letters sent to patients or other medical 
practitioners about patients 
2. Workstations such as desktops and laptops that have PHI saved locally to them 
3. Web Servers or other such systems that are not primary information 
repositories of PHI but could be used for secondary services such as 
appointment bookings, in the case of an online booking facility that may be 
offered 
4. Emails if staff in small medical practices have used email to forward personally 
identifiable health information 
5. Another crucial “outside” system would be a directory service that is used for 
authentication purposes when granting user access privileges to PHI data stores 
 
This is not an exhaustive list of such systems; it is intended just to highlight the 
potential multitude of them that may exist. The key identifier for these systems is that 
they can or do store PHI even though they are not the primary information store for 
such information or that they are in a position of trust and interaction with “inside 
systems”. 
 
It is important to identify such systems as any risk they pose to the security and 
confidentiality of medical data could easily be over looked. Furthermore the 
integration they have with the “inside” system could place them in a position of trust, 
which could be exploited to improperly access medical data. Take for example if there 
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were a vulnerability on a server that was running the directory service against which 
the “inside” HIS authenticated users, that could allow access to PHI through a side 
door, if the security posture of the “inside” system was harder to circumvent than the 
security posture of a trusted “outside” system, that still puts the medical data at as 
much risk as if the “inside” systems security posture was poor.  
 
From the example small medical practice network outlined in figure 2 of this chapter 
the outside data state could apply to the file sharing, email and backup services running 
on the GP Practice server as well as the workstation computers connected to the 
network if any of those were to store and process medical data outside of the confines 
of processing it with the HIS client software they may have installed. 
4.4.3  Over 
PHI is in the “over” state when it is being transferred between other systems, be they 
“inside” and or “outside” systems or from one type to the other, i.e. an “inside” system 
to an “outside” system. That particular case could happen with the example small 
medical practice network as per figure 2 when the HIS is backed up to tape drive, this 
is a transfer between an “inside” and an “outside” system. 
 
The other obvious example of an over system is the network that the server and 
workstation computers are connected to as PHI data will be passing over it. But 
additional less obvious examples would include PHI being saved on a USB storage 
device to be transferred from one system to another. The main identifier of “over” 
systems is that their primary purpose is to transport data, possibly including PHI. 
4.4.4  Classification overview 
The general categorisations of the systems that are being modelled have been provided. 
The intention is to provide a holistic approach to assessing the systems and processes 
that the practices use to store and process PHI and medical data. It is important that 
individual systems do not receive too much focus. Like any network and group of 
users who use the network there is interdependency between the elements of the 
network in addition to the users to ensure protection and security of the data contained 
within the network. If too much focus is placed on one single system or process, say 
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protection of the HIS for example, to the detriment of other crucial systems or 
processes, assigning user access rights perhaps, that can lead to threats that the data 
contained in the network may be exposed. Hence the necessity for a holistic approach 
that encompasses all the elements of the network, systems and processes that exist with 
and around the PHI data that is being protected.  
 
This high-level data classification of “inside, outside and over” is the first step in 
analysing the security mechanisms in place to help secure and protect that data, a more 
applied and detailed classification system is required to understand what is needed to 
be done to secure the PHI data within the “inside, outside and over” model for small 
medical practices. 
4.5 Systems and Services Classification and examination 
The systems and services classifications will further be broken down into 
“Application, Platform and Data”. 
 
Figure 4.14: Systems and Services Classification and Examination 
Within the “inside, outside and over” PHI Data classification states it is important to 
understand the systems and services within which the PHI data resides. This will be an 
aide for understanding what is needed to help secure and protect such data for small 
medical practices, the “application, platform, data” classification will assist in this. 
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Before going any further however it is necessary to point out that there is much cross-
pollination between application, platform and data. For example, to briefly skip ahead 
for a moment, if reviewing the “platform” segment, i.e. the operating system and 
configuration of a server that hosts a small medical practices HIS as part of the 
“inside” component examination, you may also be reviewing at the same time the 
“platform” segment of the “outside” data classification if the same server that hosts the 
HIS also hosts the file server that is the “outside” data classification.  
 
The exact details of the “application, platform and data” classifications will be 
expanded upon further, it is important at this stage to understand the inter-related 
nature of the systems and classifications. This can lead to a security configuration of 
one system or service within a PHI data state classification spilling into and covering 
other PHI data state classifications within the security model. This can lead to 
duplication within the security model. However because each small medical practice 
will be unique it is better to have duplication of security checks than to possibly miss a 
crucial security posture. 
 
This method also lends scalability to the model. While it is small medical practices that 
are being reviewed the model will also lend itself to the review of larger medical 
practices as they will have the same class of systems and deal with the same type of 
PHI information, the size and complexity of the inter related systems is not a limiting 
factor of this security model. Finally, the perspective taken for the model is that of the 
PHI data as opposed to the systems. The PHI data can exist in multiple states and it is 
the data within those states that is to be protected, the protection and security of the 
systems through which the PHI data of small medical practices store and process that 
data is only the method with which the phi data is secured. 
4.5.1   Application 
For the purposes of this part of the model the term application should be considered to 
cover the main purpose for which the PHI related service is being used. Say for 
example a server running a Windows Server Operating System was hosting a HIS that 
stored PHI on the patients for the small medial practices. For the categorisations of this 
model the application is the HIS system. Another example would be a server that was 
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hosting a file sharing service to which PHI could or is being stored, in that instance the 
application categorisation applies to file sharing service. 
 
Aspects of the “application” that need to be examined for security purposes will vary. 
In almost all instances they will include ensuring that any software patches available 
for the application are applied and that best practices in the configuration of the 
application are adhered to. From the development and programming perspective 
regular third party code reviews and other software security best practices are 
important. However the problem with such suggestions is the difficulty in ascertaining 
if they are complied with when the application being developed is being developed and 
supplied by another who do not have an incentive to inform customers and users of the 
security features of the product unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. 
4.5.2  Platform 
The platform classification relates to the systems and services that interact with the 
“application” and “data” classifications that correspond to the PHI that is being stored 
and processed in the “inside” state of the systems that a small medical practice may 
use. For example it would refer to the server operating system security posture where 
the PHI that is stored and processed resides. It would also cover the “outside” state 
when referring to the operating system security posture of the client systems that 
interact with the HIS “application”. 
 
The “platform” classicisation does not refer just to operating systems though. It would 
also include the anti virus software installed on the “platform” systems and its update 
setting for example. 
 
There is a broad scope for the “platform” classification within this model, further 
examples would include directory services configuration and patch management. 
however this is important because of the large number of diverse systems that can co-
exist and interact on a small medical practice network or other network and the trust 
relationships that may exist between them which could potentially expose the PHI that 
is been protected to exposure and risk.  
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4.5.3  Data 
For the purposes of this model the “data” classification refers to the actual PHI in 
whatever format it exists within any of the “inside, outside and over” states of the 
security model for small medical practices. While the “application” classification may 
process the PHI data and the data may reside on the “platform” component of the 
security model, the “data” classification is what the intent is to protect and secure. 
 
For example if the “platform”, (server operating system), or the “application”, (HIS 
software), were to be compromised but the data was protected, using cryptography for 
example, then the risk of a data breach of protected health information is much less 
reduced. Typically cryptography and encryption will be important methods used to 
protect PHI as well as access controls which restrict the PHI that users and systems 
that do not need access to the “data” get. 
 
However security through the “data” classification of this security model for small 
medical practices is not enough on its own though. If the key management solution is 
compromised through a vulnerability of the “platform” classification within the 
security model, then the PHI is at as much risk as if there were no “data” classification 
protections put in place. Thus perspective is required, and a holistic approach is 
necessary, to provide a multiple layered security model that elps to protect and secure 
PHI data in small medical practices. 
4.6 Security Measure and Resources 
The security framework for the systems and services classification and examination 
layer of the model being designed will mostly be made up of two separate components, 
configuration and standards. 
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Figure 4.15: Security Measures and Resources framework 
 
1. Configuration.  
This is refers to the base configuration of the system or systems from a security 
perspective, for example ensuring that critical security updates are applied, that 
remote access via the root account is not available for Unix based operating 
systems. To an extent it is how to apply security to a system and some of the 
tools used to do so. The configuration recommendations made within this 
project for the security model under construction will be a relatively short list 
of such available. It would not be possible to list every possible permutation of 
security settings and tools available to the systems of small medical practices 
unfortunately. Also, some brevity is required for this project due to space 
constraints. Thus the recommendations made should not be considered a 
complete nor even a definitive guide on such matters, the intention is to provide 
a sound core foundation of general security configurations in a manner that 
allows that foundation to be expanded upon and apply to the differing system 
specific points or differing small medical practices. 
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2. Standards.  
These are recognised standards and best practices for securing systems and 
services that are commonly used in small medical practice environments, for 
example the HL7 standard as referred to in chapter 3 would be an example of a 
standard that could be applied to an application service in an inside data state. 
They act as add-ons and plug-ins for this security model by providing a 
reference of more detailed information on the matter at hand. The standards 
used will not be an exhaustive list of those available and nor will they be the 
only option open to help secure the systems in question, there are a multitude 
of such documents available, any of which may be as valid as the others. 
However the ones used in this model will have the intention of at least meeting 
the need at hand and being valid enough to help ensure the security of the 
confidential PHI that is being protected. 
 
Some of the configuration and standards resources that could be included in the 
application, platform and data classification’s will be illustrated to aide the 
understanding of the problem domain that faces small medical practices. It should be 
noted that these are not a full list of the available or relevant materials and measures. 
There are a sample of such resources and in many instances some of the more desirable 
measures to implement. 
 
There are a number of perspectives that could be taken when examining the individual 
classifications security measures and resources, including that of the software vendors 
engineering team and the systems administrator that is responsible for installing and 
maintaining the systems in question. Due to the nature of the relationships between 
vendors and systems administrators it may not always be possible for the systems 
administrators to perform all these recommendations though. 
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4.7 Complete Security Model Overview 
 
Figure 4.16: Complete Security Model Overview 
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4.8 Security Measures and Resources explained 
4.8.1  Application 
Configuration 
 
• Software security development guides and best practices 
 
Many vendors provide guidance on how to develop software in a secure 
manner for their platforms, e.g. the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle 
Process, (Microsoft, Unknown). Wherever possible, software should be 
developed in accordance with such guidance, if the medical practice can 
ascertain from the supplier if this has been done it will aide them in 
understanding the security posture of the application. 
 
• Test products for security purposes  
Software testing is a crucial activity for software life cycle management; such 
testing should also include specific testing for security purposes when 
application developers are developing software that meets the “application” 
classification of this security model. The small medical practice should 
enquire from the supplier of the product if security testing was carried out on 
the product during its development. 
 
For the systems administrators who are responsible for installing the 
“application” software it may not be possible for them to test it to the 
maximum extent as they will have limited knowledge of the software and 
limited access to the source code. However, as far as practical it would be 
beneficial if they were to carry out security specific testing once the software 
is installed and when it is updated, Scarfone et al, (2008, C), provides some 
guidance on this. 
 
• Code reviews for security purposes  
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Code reviewing is a practice whereby a third party reviews the source code for 
the “application” in question with a perspective for security. The systems 
administrator for a small medical practice is unlikely to have access to the 
source code of the “application”, unless it is an open source project or a custom 
made in house application, is limited in the extent to which they can carry out 
these actions. However the developers of the “application” system, particularly 
if it is designed to store and process PHI, should do so on a regular basis. 
Wherever possible medical practices should enquire as to whether such code 
reviews took place during the development of the application. 
 
• Application Sandboxing and Application Firewalls 
 
Application firewalls act in a similar way to network firewalls, they segment 
the data flow around application processes and allow only certain interactions 
to take place. Sandboxing in software terms is similar to this but often 
implemented at the operating system level. 
 
Either or both of these security features will aide the “application” classified 
software security posture by restricting the access to a PHI related application, 
say a HIS, other processes and services have, thus reducing the threat surface 
applicable to the “application”. It would be advisable for systems 
administrators to utilise such defences when installing “application” classified 
systems and services if such is possible. 
 
• Digitally Signed Software 
 
Signed software is that which has a security certificate applied to it to ensure its 
authenticity and that it has not been modified between release by the vendor 
and receipt by the customer. Wherever possible it would be useful for vendors 
to release software and updates in a signed manner as this provides assurances 
to those that are installing and running such software that it is authentic. 
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Figure 4.17: Application Resource Framework 
 
 
Standards, as listed in bibliography 
 
For matters such as those surrounding the use of HIS and EHR software standards can 
be very useful and assuring due to the sensitive nature of the PHI data that such 
software processes, as outlined in chapter three. If a product complies with a certain 
security standard then there is some certainty as to the secure nature of the product. 
Some standards, which were referenced in chapter three and can be used as guidance 
for applications that are specifically in the area of software for health informatics 
systems include: 
 
• ISO 27001 - ISO 27799:2008 Health informatics  
• Health Level 7, HL7 Security 
• CEN 13606 - Health informatics  
• OWASP Guide Project, (OWASP Guide Project, 2011) 
• Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle Process , (Microsoft, Unknown) 
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4.8.2  Platform 
 
Configuration 
 
• Server and client host hardening 
 
Vendors may provide configuration guides and best practices for the products 
they supply, e.g. (Microsoft, 2006 - A), a Microsoft Exchange Server 2003 
Security Hardening Guide. There is an onus for the systems administrators of 
small medical practices to ensure that any platform that hosts or processes PHI 
data complies with such best practices wherever possible 
 
• Operating System Patch installation policy 
 
Operating system vendors regularly release security updates for their products. 
It is a crucial security posture that such patches are applied in a timely manner 
to ensure the security of the platform systems that host PHI in small medical 
practices. 
 
• Line of business software patching policy 
 
Line of business or other applications such as HIS systems or other software 
that integrates with the systems and platforms where PHI resides and is 
processed in small medical practices may also have periodic security updates 
released for them. Timely installation of such updates is important in order to 
ensure the security posture of the platform in question.  
 
• Anti Virus software installation and update policy 
 
Anti Virus software helps to prevent the intrusion of virus and other malicious 
software on client and server computers. Installation of a reputable anti virus 
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program and regular update of such is important to help ensure the security 
state of any network. It is also advisable to centrally manage such programs, so 
that instead of just relying on the automatic update feature built into the 
application, proactive steps are taken to check that such updates take place. 
 
• OS level security technologies 
 
Many modern operating systems will include specific security technologies that 
are designed to harden and protect the system from attack and malicious 
interference, these technologies include: 
 
o Data-execution protection (DEP) 
DEP is designed to prevent an application from executing code in a 
memory space that is not indented to execute code, Microsoft, (2006 - 
B). 
o Address-space layout randomization (ASLR) 
Makes it more difficult for malicious code to guess or estimate the 
location of memory identifiers for other processes. 
 
• File systems support file level security and encryption  
 
File level access controls can be applied to prevent un-authorised persons or 
systems from accessing data, which they have no right to see. This is an 
important requirement of any “platform” that stores PHI data to ensure that 
only those who should access it can. 
 
Encryption is the process whereby the plain text of the data to be protected has 
a cryptographic algorithm applied to it to transform it into a cypher text that it 
is not possible to understand without the cypher key that was used by the 
cryptographic algorithm to turn the plain text into a cypher text. It is important 
that platform systems that can store and process PHI data in small medical 
practices have the capability to encrypt such data if it is necessary to do so. 
 
• Certificates for authentication, encryption and non repudiation  
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A digital certificate is a way to ensure trust between two or more systems and 
that sources of data are who they claim they are.  
 
• Directory Service configuration 
 
A centralized and managed logon service is important for any organization. It 
helps to ensure that common security policies, such as password changes and 
strengths are globally enforced. Services such as Microsoft’s Active Directory 
can also provide centrally managed configuration settings for client and server 
computers that are connected to the directory service which further improve the 
security posture of those computers. 
 
• Client screen saver policy 
 
A simple way to suffer a data breach is to simply leave sensitive information 
visible on a computer screen that anyone may see. Ensuring that computer 
screens lock and require a password to unlock them when users are away from 
their computers will help prevent such potential breaches. 
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Figure 4.18: Platform Resource Framework 
 
Standards, as listed in bibliography 
 
• (Scarfone et al, 2008, A) 
• (Microsoft, 2009) 
• ISO/TS 21091:2005. Health informatics -- Directory services for security, 
communications and identification of professionals and patients 
• (AusCERT & CERT/CC, 2001) 
• (Scarfone et al, 2008, B) 
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4.8.3  Data 
 
Configuration 
 
• Physical access controls 
 
Physical access controls to the data itself and the mediums on which the data is 
stored are important to implement. These will include ensuring that physical 
records are stored in a secure location and that physical access controls such as 
locked doors are in place for the computers and storage media upon which the 
PHI data is stored. 
 
• Access Level Controls for files and services 
 
It is important to ensure that restrictions on what PHI data users and other 
systems can access is based upon a strict “need to know” policy. If there is no 
requirement for a user or a system to have access to a particular data store then 
such access should not be granted. Granularity of such access is also important, 
if read only access is all that is required then that is what should only be 
provided. 
 
• Where data is stored, including in the cloud 
 
Data can be stored in a number of locations and concerns can be raised if PHI 
is stored in inappropriate locations, these could include but not be limited to: 
 
o Cloud Storage and processing facilities. If data is to be stored and or 
processed offsite in a cloud environment strong consideration as to the 
ramifications and potential issues of this should be considered. (ENISA, 
2009), provide a useful breakdown of both the risks and benefits of 
using such facilities and particular note through a case study of eHealth 
solutions for cloud computing. The report states: 
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“In some cases, it may be difficult for the cloud customer (in its 
role as data controller) to effectively check the data handling 
practices of the cloud provider and thus to be sure that the data 
is handled in a lawful way.” 
 
A checklist that cloud computing customers can use for assurance of the 
protection of their data is provided and would be a useful document for 
small medical practices to use if they were to consider cloud computing 
facilities. 
 
It should also be noted that employees may use cloud computing 
facilities themselves, e.g. online email services, that have the potential 
to store or process PHI data either through an “inside” or an “outside” 
data classification states without knowledge or consideration of the 
potential security risks. A policy and guidance should be put in place to 
educate staff of the potential risks of such. 
 
o The PHI data of small medical practices could also be stored on 
removable and external storage media such as USB keys or CD ROMS. 
Policies and procedures are required to prevent such from happening. 
The only place that PHI data should be stored is within the “inside” data 
classification state of the systems a small medical practice may use, e.g. 
a HIS or EHR.  
 
• Secure Erasure of data 
 
When data has become end of life it should be securely erased. This would 
include soft copies of data, e.g. PHI records that are no longer required within 
the “inside” system, say for people that are no longer patients of the practice. 
But also for hard drives and other storage media that are being retired from use. 
Such storage media should be securely erased and the data on them destroyed. 
 
• Data Backups 
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Special care needs to be taken of data backups. Say for example if a taped 
backup copy of the data base for the HIS of a small medical practice is stored 
offsite protective measures should be taken in such circumstances to ensure 
that while the availability portion of the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability paradigm is being maintained, so too is the confidentiality 
requirement of the PHI data in question preserved.   
 
• Cryptography 
 
Cryptography has already been explained in this chapter, but it should be noted 
that there are different levels and layers at which the cryptography can be 
applied as well as differing media and assets to which the cryptography should 
be applied to. These can include: 
 
o File level encryption 
o Full disk encryption, particularly for laptops 
o Encryption of backup media, tapes, hard drives 
o Encryption of portable media, CD’s USB keys 
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Figure 4.19: Data Resource Framework 
 
 
Standards, as listed in bibliography 
 
• (NSA, 2000) 
• (NIST, 2001) 
• (ENISA, 2009) 
 
Over PHI Data Classification state, specific network use case 
 
The “over” PHI data classification state applies to when data is transitioning between 
different data classification states, “inside and outside” and between differing systems 
and services classifications within and between the “inside and outside” states of this 
security model for small medical practices. This state includes the usage of networking 
facilities and equipment. While the “platform” component of the systems and services 
classifications could refer to matters such as router configuration hardening and 
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management of available networking services, the “application” component of the 
systems and services classification would apply to the services such as VPN and 
wireless network access that are available. As with much of the security model for 
small medical practices being presented as part of this project there is much replication 
and cross-pollination between these layers of “platform and application”. Some 
particular emphasis will be paid to networking facilities here though because of their 
importance and trusted nature within the environment of a small medical practice. 
 
Configuration 
 
• Firewall 
 
A firewall service running between the small medical practices network and the 
Internet is an important security practice to have in place. It will reduce the 
exposure of the PHI data contained within the network to risk of attack and 
access from outside the network. 
 
• Router configuration 
 
It is important to ensure that basic configurations such as changing the default 
password on the router and updating the firmware and other software on it, as 
well as disabling all unnecessary services are carried out to reduce the threat 
vector that the network is exposed to. 
 
• Network segmentation 
 
Dividing the network so that access between hosts is limited and restricted is an 
effective way to reduce the exposure of systems within the network. Say for 
example if a printer that was connected to the network was compromised or an 
attacker was spoofing the network address used by that printer but the printer 
was in a network segment that only allowed it to communicate over protocols 
that a printer would use, that would considerably reduce the attack surface 
available to the attacker. 
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o Separate logical networks for servers and clients 
Virtual Local Area Networks, VLAN’s, would be used to achieve this. 
Restricting the servers and the clients from communicating with each 
other is an effective way of helping to protect the PHI data of the 
network, if only one segment is compromised that reduces the risk to 
the other segment. 
 
• Host based firewalls 
 
Host based firewalls are software firewalls that run on a client or server 
computer can be used in addition to a network layer firewall, they should not 
be used in place of one however. For example if it was not possible segment 
the network to separate the server from the client computers then a host-based 
firewall can be used in lieu of such network segmentation.  
 
• Protection during transfer 
 
It is important to protect the communication channel between systems that 
communicate PHI data to one another. If an attacker could gain access to the 
network it may be possible for them to intercept the PHI data passing between 
systems if it is in a plain text. 
 
o SSL and TLS encryption 
These are the mechanisms employed to secure the hyper text transfer 
protocol, (http), if a web based service is used to pass the data between 
the systems this may be an appropriate security mechanism to employ. 
 
• VPN 
 
In the context of small medical practices, Virtual Private Networking is used to 
connect a remote host on an untrusted network to network of a small medical 
practice in a secure manner. If users are to work from home all such work 
should be done over a VPN connection. 
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• 802.1X Wireless 
 
The 802.1X standard is used to secure wireless communication. If a small 
medical practice is to use a wireless network then it should be protected using 
the Wi-Fi Protection Access, (WPA), protocol. 
 
• IDS 
 
Intrusion Detection System’s are used to monitor for and mitigate against 
remote attacks on a network and unusual and potentially hazardous traffic on 
the internal network. The are beneficial to use to help ensure that the network is 
not compromised and take action if an attacker is trying to compromise the 
network. 
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Figure 4.20: Network Resource Framework 
 
Standards, as listed in bibliography  
 
• (Scarfone and Hoffman, 2009) 
• (SANS, 2005) 
• (Alabady, 2009) 
• (Rigney et al, 2000) 
• (IEEE, 2004) 
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4.9 General rules and recommendations to follow 
A short list of some general rules and recommendations to follow will be helpful. 
Many of these points are covered in some manner in the outlined security model but 
the following points are useful security mechanisms to employ regardless of what layer 
of the model they are implemented at. 
 
Change management of systems and processes in place is important. 
When change is needed that may impact a system that stores or processes PHI data 
careful consideration of the overall security posture of the systems as a whole withing 
the small medical practice should be taken. 
PHI data should not be stored on web servers or other servers that have direct access to 
the internet. 
PHI Data should only reside on a system that is an “inside” system within the data 
classification model for this security model, e.g. a HIS system. 
PHI data should not be stored on removable media such as USB keys or similar. 
Wireless networks that can access PHI data should be encrypted, even if other security 
mechanisms such as transport level encryption is being employed 
Figure 4.21: General rules and recommendations 
4.10 Scope and limitations of the Security Model 
With the states that PHI data can reside having been identified as “inside, outside and 
over”, this will aide in identifying the critical systems and processes that the practice 
must protect and adhere to in order to help ensure the confidentiality, availability and 
integrity of the PHI that the practice stores and processes for its patients. 
 
Once those systems are identified and categorised though it is necessary to be able to 
ascertain the state of security that they offer.  
 
4.10.1Limitations of the Security Model 
A note of caution needs to be made at this stage that it is never possible to 100% 
guarantee the state of security of any system or data that resides within itself. As 
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Arthur, (2011), writes, “Hacking is possible because modern computer systems are so 
complex that there will always be a flaw to be exploited somewhere”. This model will 
outline a method for helping to ensure the security and protection of PHI data for small 
medical practices, even the strictest possible adherence to this model cannot guarantee 
that security fully though unfortunately. 
 
4.10.2 Scope of the Security Model 
Looking at another framework that intends to help protect health information, Tulu &  
Chatterjee’s, (2003), “A new security framework for HIPAA compliant health 
information systems”, a detailed and extremely useful conceptual model is developed 
that addresses the technical and organisation issues needed to help protect health 
information in the context of the Health Insurance and Portability and Accountability 
Act’s, (HIPAA), security rule. It details the stages of a framework intended to help 
management decide how to make their organisation HIPAA compliant. This model is 
extremely valuable but it does unfortunately have limited application to small medical 
practices. The requirement in such an environment is for a more applied, less high-
level model. 
 
This is because of the limited scope of organisations being catered for. Instead of a 
multitude of differing organisations and organisation types that can store and process 
PHI, the model being constructed for this model is dealing with a more homogenous 
subset of organisations in small medical practices. For example it is likely that the 
surveyed small medical practices will be using a single server computer to host their 
HIS as outlined in figure 2 of this chapter. It is also likely that the server will be 
running a Windows Server Operating System, which has almost 67% of market share 
according to one estimate, Wakabayashi, (2008). This provides benefits as it allows 
more specific’s to be included in the security model that is being constructed.  
 
4.11 Security Model Construction 
These specifics can be included as add-ons to a more generalised base model that 
covers a wider domain to ensure the model is not however overly specific to become 
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un-helpful to practices unless they fit a very exact subset of systems. As an example of 
the more generalised base model take (Massachusetts 201 CMR 17.00), standards for 
data protection which outlines a broad approach to the duty’s and standards required 
for protection of personal information in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts yet with 
some specific requirements and implementations. It outlines for example the 
requirements for computer system security which are very specific yet allow leeway in 
the implementation of the requirement:  
 
“Encryption of all transmitted records and files containing personal 
information that will travel across public networks, and encryption of all data 
containing personal information to be transmitted wirelessly” 
 
(Massachusetts 201 CMR 17.00) 
 
These are specific requirements, that data, which is personally identifiable and is 
transiting any public and or wireless network must be encrypted, but it is general in 
that it does not specify the encryption system or algorithm to be used or the level at 
which it is to be encrypted. Imagine that a small medical practice had a wireless 
network over which computers could connect to the HIS. The practice would have the 
option of encrypting either the wireless network itself, using the WPA2 protocol 
perhaps, or the mechanism used to communicate with the HIS, the HTTPS protocol for 
example. 
 
For the purposes of this model many of the specifics will take the form or standards or 
other published recommendations and best practices that are designed to increase the 
level of security of systems, take for example Microsoft’s Windows XP Baseline 
Security Checklists4 which aim to harden the Windows XP client operating system 
against attack. By using this approach the knowledge of experts in the area can be 
harnessed to further reinforce the protection systems being applied to the PHI 
processing and storing systems. 
                                                
4 Windows XP Baseline Security Checklists, available: 
 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc751488.aspx, last accessed 27th of June 
2011. 
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4.12 Limitations of application of the security model to the 
surveyed small medical practices 
Due to the constraints of the primary research methodology, which is to conduct 
interviews with one or two people associated with the practice, it will not be possible 
to conduct in-depth investigations to comprehensively compare the surveyed practices 
against the designed security model. For example the CORAS method, (den Braber et 
al, 2007), of security analysis uses multiple workshops and meetings with differing 
personnel from the organisation being analysed. However such a method is designed 
for larger organisations than the small medical practices that this project is 
investigating. 
 
Due to the restrictions of the time available to the interviewee’s that agreed to be 
interviewed for this project it was not possible to conduct the investigation in such a 
detailed fashion. The approach this project will instead take is to conduct detailed 
interviews with key stakeholders in the small medical practices.  
 
It is intended that these detailed interviews will provide valuable information, which 
can provide an accurate and adequate assessment of the practices compared to the 
security model. For example the OCTAVE® S approach for managing information 
security risks, which is a refined version of the full OCTAVE® approach designed for 
large organisations and then refined for small organisations in the OCTAVE® S 
approach, (Alberts et al, 2003), details a 3 phased approach for managing information 
security risks for small organisations.  
 
Phase 1, building asset-based threat profiles, and phase 2, identifying infrastructure 
vulnerabilities can be conducted to an extent that allows for validation of the practice 
against the constructed security model through a significantly detailed interview of a 
person or persons with the necessary level of knowledge of the practice systems and 
procedures. Phase 3, developing security strategy and plans, is less appropriate for this 
project as the intention is to take a snapshot of the level of security within the practice 
when compared against the constructed security model by an external body and is not 
being done within the practice as a whole to improve on their current plans and 
strategies. 
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In order to build threat profiles and identify infrastructure vulnerabilities a method of 
classification and examination of the systems and services that store and process PHI 
data in small medical practices will be utilised based upon the outlined security model 
in this chapter. 
4.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a technical and procedural security model that can be used 
to protect Personal Health Information in small medical practices and understand how 
that information is currently being protected in the survey practices. 
 
Much repetition of security mechanisms and procedures is inherent in the outlined 
security model; this is not necessarily however a bad thing as it helps to ensure there 
are multiple layer’s of protection. 
 
With the security model outlined for small medical practices it will be possible to 
protect the PHI data that resides in such a practice as well as being able to ascertain 
and gauge the level of protection available in such practices. 
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5 EXPERIMENTATION & EVALUATION  
5.1 Introduction 
The experiment for this project was broken into two parts. Firstly a security expert 
validated the previously described security model. The second part was to use the 
security model to assess the level of data protection and computer security in a sample 
of small medical practices through qualitative research. 
 
The first step, the validation by a security expert, of the two-step experiment was 
necessary to ensure that the designed security model was applicable and effective for 
the small medical practices and that it would provide an adequate way to apply 
security to and understand the security posture of the practices. 
 
With the security model validated primary qualitative research could then be carried 
out to investigate the level of data protection in the surveyed small medical practices. 
This qualitative research was carried out by performing interviews with stakeholders in 
a number of small medical practices. 
5.2 Experimentation 
5.2.1  Experiment overview, data protection and computer security in 
small medical practices 
The intention of this component of the experiment is to determine the level of data 
protection and computer security in small medical practices in Ireland when compared 
to the previously designed security model. To this end qualitative research was carried 
out in a number of small medical practices with an appropriate research methodology. 
 
The experiment was simply to compare the protections applied to personal health 
information in the surveyed practices against the constructed security model for this 
project. 
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5.2.2  Research Methodology 
The qualitative research methodology used was a structured interview methodology 
applied to relevant stakeholders in the small medical practices. A fixed set and 
sequence of predetermined questions was administered to the respondents and the 
respondents were given the option to see the questions in advance of the interview if 
they wished. The same set of questions was administered to all respondents. 
5.2.3  Research Methodology Justification 
This was necessary for a number of reasons. It was not expected that access to a large 
sample of medical practices would be available in order to administer a wide-ranging 
survey, thus the option to carry out interviews in order to obtain detailed information 
from the surveyed small medical practices was chosen. This would allow the 
questioning to be more detailed and also to allow the researcher to gauge the implicit 
understanding of data protection and computer security matters in small medical 
practices through meaning analysis of the question responses. 
 
A structured interview methodology was also required due to the large amount of 
detailed information required to gauge a practices data security and protection posture 
against the security model outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
Notes were taken of each interview and recordings were made as appropriate but not 
all respondents were willing to be recorded. 
5.2.4  Interview design, linking the data received from the interviews to 
the security propositions in the security model 
The constructed security model is a complex artefact that required detailed 
investigation in a small medical practice. To be able to ascertain the level of protection 
as per the Inside, Outside and Over data states model, while further iterating each data 
state into the application, platform and data systems classifications and then applying 
security measures and resources from the security model to each system and service is 
a large task.  
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In order to do so the logic applied to the interview structure was to divide it into two 
sections, the first was more focussed on data protection and other governance 
requirements; the second part was focussed on more technical aspects of computer 
security and data protection. That is not to say however that each section was exclusive 
of the other, for example the matter of requiring a password to unlock a computer was 
dealt with under the data protection and other governance requirements section, but 
such a protection is equally a technical protection as well. This structure was also 
chosen in order to separate the technical questions, which a non technical staff member 
in a medical practice, such as a practice manager, from the more technical questions 
that the non technical staff member would be less likely to answer. The more technical 
questions may need to be referred to a person with more technical knowledge of the 
practice. 
 
Each section then had a number of sub sections that were designed to map and link the 
questions in the interview to components of the constructed security model. The 
methodology applied was to ask at least one question that applied to one security 
measure from the security model in chapter 4. Wherever possible questions were re-
enforced in such a way that repeated the question, e.g. whether or not anti virus 
software was set to automatically update as well as a question asking if anti virus 
software was centrally managed in order to receive updates. 
 
These repetition of questioning area’s served as a control to ensure that the interviewee 
understood what was being asked and it also facilitated greater knowledge solicitation 
as it served to delve deeper into the understanding of the interviewee to the matter at 
hand. A full list of the questions posed to the respondents is available in the appendix. 
In total there were 100 items of unique information that were investigated in each 
practice. 
5.2.5  Data Protection controls and security measures section 
The following areas were investigated during the interview process in each small 
medical practice from the perspective of data protection and other governance matters. 
These areas map directly to the Data protection checklist for small medical practices 
established in chapter 2.  
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 1. Are	  there	  documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  policy	  compliance	  in	  place?	  For	  example	  were	  the	  	  
o Registration	  with	  Data	  Protection	  Commissioner	  
o Existence	  of	  a	  written	  internal	  data	  protection	  policy	  document	  
o Defined	  and	  documented	  controls	  for	  deciding	  access	  levels	  to	  PHI	  
o Whether	  there	  is	  a	  designated	  person	  who	  has	  responsibility	  for	  security	  and	  data	  protection	  
o Existence	  of	  a	  data	  retention	  policy	  
o Existence	  of	  a	  data	  subject	  access	  request	  policy	  
o Existence	  of	  a	  data	  breach	  response	  plan	  
 2. Computer	  account	  and	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
o Password	  and	  screen	  locking	  policies	  
o Computer	  account	  creation	  and	  termination	  procedures	  
o Controls	  around	  leakage	  of	  PHI	  from	  its	  primary	  repository	  
 3. Controls	  and	  protections	  applied	  to	  physical	  files	  
 4. Staff	  training,	  understanding	  and	  control	  matters	  
o Understanding	  of	  the	  legal	  environment	  associated	  with	  data	  protection	  in	  Ireland	  
o Staff	  training	  in	  data	  protection	  matters	  
o Contractual	  and	  other	  controls	  applied	  to	  staff	  to	  protect	  PHI	  
o Understanding	  of	  future	  legislation	  and	  future	  concerns	  in	  regards	  data	  protection	  matters	  
5.2.6  Technical controls and security measures section 
The following areas were investigated during the interview process in each small 
medical practice from a technical perspective. These area’s originate directly from the 
security model designed in chapter 4 of this project 
 5. Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
o Responsibility	  for	  monitoring	  for	  vulnerabilities	  and	  ensuring	  backups	  complete	  and	  work	  
o Responsibility	  for	  monitoring	  contractors	  and	  third	  party	  support	  companies	  
 6. Inside	  data	  classification	  security	  measures	  
o Security	  certification	  of	  HIS	  Application	  system	  
o Responsibility	  for	  HIS	  maintenance	  
o Ensuring	  that	  the	  HIS	  is	  the	  only	  data	  repository	  for	  PHI	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 7. Outside	  data	  classification	  security	  measures	  
o Control	  of	  medical	  devices	  connected	  to	  the	  network	  
o Control	  of	  other	  locations	  where	  PHI	  data	  may	  be	  stored,	  either	  intentionally	  or	  not	  
o Control	  and	  management	  of	  data	  backups	  
o Platform	  Security	  for	  Client	  computers	  
o Platform	  Security	  for	  Server	  computers	  
o Control	  of	  PHI	  data	  in	  cloud	  storage	  and	  processing	  facilities	  
 8. Over	  data	  classification	  security	  measures	  
o Secure	  Network	  design	  and	  segmentation	  
o Wireless	  networking	  security	  
o Destruction	  of	  data	  on	  devices	  that	  are	  no	  longer	  in	  use	  
o Protection	  of	  data	  being	  transferred	  in	  offsite	  backups	  
o Use	  of	  secure	  remote	  working	  facilities	  
o Network	  monitoring	  for	  potentially	  malicious	  activity	  
5.2.7  Criteria for interpreting the findings 
The concept of security metrics was considered but discounted. Security metrics have 
been defined as follows. 
 
“Measurements provide single-point-in-time views of specific, discrete factors, 
while metrics are derived by comparing to a predetermined baseline two or 
more measurements taken over time” 
 
Payne, (2006) 
 
Because metrics are derived by comparison to a predetermined baseline and only one 
assessment was planned for each practice, it was not possibly employ them in this 
instance. 
 
Criteria for interpreting the findings were still required though. It was decided to use a 
measure of adequacy for each individual piece of data pertaining to the data protection 
and computer security that was posed to the interviewee. That is to say, was the 
protection they described adequate to the task of ensuring the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of the medical data they were charged with protecting? 
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This project will use the criteria of adequacy as defined in the constructed security 
model to assess the findings in the individual small medical practices surveyed. There 
will be three differing levels of adequacy used. 
 1. Not	  adequate,	  i.e.	  no	  protections	  are	  applied	  or	  the	  matter	  has	  not	  been	  considered.	  
 2. Somewhat	  adequate,	  i.e.	  some	  protections	  are	  applied	  but	  could	  be	  improved	  upon.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  polices	  and	  procedures,	  there	  may	  be	  an	  awareness	  within	  the	  practice	  as	  to	  the	  specific	  policy,	  (data	  subject	  access	  requests	  perhaps),	  but	  nothing	  may	  be	  formalised	  or	  documented	  on	  how	  to	  handle	  it	  in	  each	  case.	  This	  could	  be	  improved	  by	  documenting	  the	  formal	  process	  for	  such	  cases.	  
 3. Adequate,	  the	  protections	  applied	  are	  enough	  to	  secure	  system,	  process,	  and	  policies	  which	  contain	  or	  control	  PHI	  data	  as	  per	  the	  constructed	  computer	  security	  model.	  
 
These definitions of adequacy will be applied to each of the questions posed to the 
interviewee.  
5.2.8  Question Classifications 
The questions will be categorised as per sections 5.2.5 Data Protection controls and 
security measures section and 5.2.6 Technical controls and security measures section 
to give a total of 8 question classification types. These types are: 
 1. Are	  there	  documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  policy	  compliance	  in	  place?	  For	  example	  were	  the	  	  
 2. Computer	  account	  and	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
 3. Controls	  and	  protections	  applied	  to	  physical	  files	  
 4. Staff	  training,	  understanding	  and	  control	  matters	  
 5. Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
 6. Inside	  data	  classification	  security	  measures	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7. Outside	  data	  classification	  security	  measures	  
 8. Over	  data	  classification	  security	  measures	  
 
This categorisation and grouping leads to a number of easy to understand areas in 
which each of the practices and the practices as a whole can be assessed by comparison 
to the outlined security model. Each practice can also be assessed individually as a 
whole and for each of the categorisations above. 
5.2.9  Questioning during the interview  
A final note on the interview design was that the flow of the interview was not 
organised to match the outlined controls and security measures as they are detailed in 
this chapter. The questions were instead sequenced in such a way as to make them 
easier for the respondent to follow and the flow of the questioning does not map to the 
categorisation of the questions. All the points outlined in the control and security 
measures for the data protection and technical sections were examined by the interview 
questions, but not in the order presented here. Please see the appendix for the order the 
questions were posed in. 
5.2.10 Stakeholders who were interviewed 
In order to best understand the levels of data protection and computer security in the 
practices interviewed it was necessary to ensure that the stakeholder or stakeholders 
interviewed had sufficient knowledge of the practice management and technical 
aspects as possible. For this reason either the practice manager or one of the managing 
doctors was the person that was interviewed, at least in part. 
 
There was potential for there to be issues with non-technicality of some of the 
stakeholders interviewed, for example a managing doctor of a practice may know how 
to use the systems in the practice but they may not have a detailed level of knowledge 
as to the administration of the systems. Because of this, where necessary questions 
were also posed to a stakeholder who had more knowledge of the technical side of the 
systems practices, such as the company that provide IT support for a practice. 
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5.2.11 Limitations of research methodology 
When a large scale security audit is run in any environment more than one or two 
interviews will be conducted in order to fully understand the complete security posture 
of the environment, for example the CORAS Method, (den Braber et al, 2007), uses 7 
phases of detailed analysis when performing risk analysis and audit tasks. Also other 
methods such as site visits and examinations where the investigator takes a more 
detailed and proactive look at the facilities in the environment would be appropriate 
ways of gauging the security posture of an environment. 
 
Such methods were however discounted for this project though. This was because of 
the limited time that the respondents had to partake in the research and also because 
those more intrusive methods may not have been well received and meant that the 
respondents were more disinclined to participate in the research. A balance was needed 
between what could be attained by the investigator and the level of participation the 
respondents were willing to provide. 
 
Because of this it was not possible to gain a complete technical overview of the 
practices that were surveyed and as such the interviews that were conducted should be 
considered more akin to a first iteration or pass of a more detailed investigation or 
audit. It is hoped though that the results received indicate a fair representation of the 
state of data and computer security in the surveyed practices. 
5.2.12 Details of the practices where interviews were carried out 
A total of four small medical practices contributed to the primary research for this 
project. Identifiable details of these practices cannot be provided in order to preserve 
their anonymity but a brief description of each is appropriate. All practices were 
located in the greater Dublin area. 
 1. This	  practice	  provided	  care	  for	  more	  than	  8000	  patients.	  This	  care	  was	  provided	  by	  5	  general	  practitioners,	  3	  nurses	  and	  supported	  by	  5	  administrative	  staff.	  This	  practice	  was	  unique	  amongst	  the	  others	  interviewed	  as	  the	  Health	  Service	  Executive,	  HSE,	  provided	  its	  IT	  facilities.	  	  The	  Practice	  Manager	  was	  interviewed	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  and	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  provide	  detailed	  enough	  answers	  to	  some	  of	  the	  technical	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questions,	  so	  a	  follow	  up	  phone	  interview	  was	  carried	  out	  with	  a	  	  member	  of	  staff	  of	  the	  HSE’s	  Information	  and	  Communications	  Technology	  services.	  
 2. The	  second	  practice	  has	  more	  than	  13000	  patients,	  with	  care	  being	  provided	  by	  5	  general	  practitioners,	  2	  nurses	  and	  supported	  by	  5	  administrative	  staff.	  This	  practice	  was	  a	  stand	  alone	  GP	  practice	  	  The	  primary	  interview	  was	  carried	  out	  with	  one	  of	  the	  managing	  general	  practitioners	  of	  the	  surgery	  and	  a	  follow	  up	  phone	  interview	  was	  carried	  out	  with	  a	  member	  of	  staff	  from	  the	  technical	  support	  company	  that	  provide	  IT	  services	  to	  the	  surgery	  for	  the	  more	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  investigation.	  
 3. This	  practice	  provided	  care	  to	  about	  3500	  employees	  of	  a	  larger	  organisation	  whose	  main	  focus	  was	  not	  health	  care.	  The	  care	  was	  provided	  by	  4	  general	  practitioners,	  3	  nurses,	  4	  pharmacists	  and	  supported	  by	  4	  administrative	  staff.	  As	  mentioned	  this	  practice	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  organisation	  and	  many	  of	  its	  data	  protection	  initiatives	  originate	  from	  that	  organisation.	  	  The	  interview	  was	  carried	  out	  with	  the	  Administrative	  Manager	  of	  the	  surgery.	  There	  was	  no	  need	  for	  any	  follow	  up	  interview	  with	  a	  more	  technical	  person,	  as	  the	  administrative	  manager	  was	  able	  to	  adequately	  answer	  the	  technical	  questions.	  
 4. The	  final	  practice	  did	  not	  divulge	  the	  number	  of	  patients	  or	  staff	  associated	  with	  it.	  It	  is	  also	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  organisation	  whose	  primary	  focus	  is	  not	  health	  care.	  	  	  Due	  to	  the	  large	  nature	  of	  the	  organisation	  with	  differing	  offices	  and	  departments	  being	  responsible	  for	  different	  matters	  pertaining	  to	  security	  and	  data	  protection	  in	  the	  organisation,	  written	  responses	  to	  the	  questions	  were	  provided	  by	  the	  different	  offices	  and	  departments,	  no	  interview	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  this	  instance.	  
 
The numbers 1 to 4 from the description above will be used to identify the individual 
practices as they are referenced further in the text. 
5.3 Evaluation of the security model by a security expert 
The first step in the evaluation was to have the security model itself validated. Mr 
Darren Fitzpatrick, an Information Risk and Compliance Consultant at Espion 
Intelligence carried this out. 
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5.3.1  Comments from the security expert 
The full comment thread with the security expert can be found in the appendix. The 
following were the main points from the correspondence in respect to the security 
model contained in chapter 4 of this document. 
 
“Given the guidance provide using the concepts of systems and services 
classifications, their relevant security measures and resources and the ‘state’ in 
which data is secured, I would be happy to describe the model as valid. The 
model, in its current state seems conceptually sound as the foundations of a 
usable security model for PHI in small medical practices” 
 
Darren Fitzpatrick, (2011) 
 
Based on this the security model was deemed to be valid to ensure the protection of 
personal and protected health information in small medical practices in Ireland. 
 
The designed security model was not perfect however, the security expert made the 
following valid and useful comments. 
 1. Always	  look	  at	  the	  issue	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  person	  implementing	  it.	  	  2. Be	  more	  definitive	  about	  the	  security	  measures	  to	  be	  used,	  instead	  of	  recommending	  that	  they	  could	  be	  carried	  out,	  insist	  that	  they	  are	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  standard.	  
 
Due to the time constraints of the project it was not possible to incorporate these 
recommendations into the model. If the designed security model is to be used as the 
basis for any further work these recommendations should be considered. 
5.4 Evaluation of data protection and computer security in the 
small medical practices 
The results from the full interview question process can be found in the appendix. 
These findings will be summarised here to gain a better understanding of the state of 
data protection and computer security in the surveyed small medical practices. 
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5.4.1  Overall evaluation of data protection and computer security in the 
surveyed small medical practices 
Overall the results of the investigations carried out to assess the level of data protection 
and computer security in the surveyed small medical practices were positive. When 
compared to the model the practices surveyed were found to be largely in compliance 
with the security model. There were some areas of concern and they will be listed 
separately but as a whole the levels of confidentiality, integrity and availability in the 
surveyed practices were found to be adequate when compared to the security model. 
 
Some area’s that showed particularly positive results were the protection levels applied 
to the “Outside” and “Over” data classification states from the security model. The 
technical protections applied to the “Application”, “Platform” and “Data” system and 
services classifications were on the whole adequate to ensure the protection of the 
personal health information in surveyed medical practices. 
 
It is also worth noting that one particular security measure in place for the “Over” data 
classification state was that only one of the practices surveyed employed a wireless 
network and adequate protection measures were applied to that network. 
5.4.2  The implicit understanding of data protection matters in the 
surveyed practices 
When analysis of the meaning of the respondent’s response to the questions was 
interpreted it became clear that there was an implicit understanding of data protection 
matters in the surveyed practice. Each respondent took the issue seriously. Some 
examples of this included the following. 
 
The practice manager for Practice 1 stated, “it is everyone’s responsibility” when 
talking about who was responsible for security in the practice. They also commented 
on the use of a PPS number as a unique identifier for the Cervical Cancer screening 
website5 and raised concerns about the use of a persons PPS number for such. 
 
                                                
5 CervicalCheck - The National Cervical Screening Programme, www.cervicalcheck.ie 
last accessed 21st of June, 2011 
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One of the owners of Practice 2, when discussing the access that administrative staff 
has to the practices HIS commented, “Confidentiality is implied as part of the job”. 
Further they discussed an issue whereby a data breach of personal health information 
almost took place. The respondent was quite concerned by this and commented on the 
seriousness of the matter even though the breach had not occurred. Another case was 
raised whereby records were mixed up and a letter containing personal health 
information was sent to the wrong patient. That incident lead to the implementation of 
a written policy for issuing patient information in the practice 
 
The administrative manager for Practice 3 stated that access to health information was 
granted on a “need to know basis” when staff members were being setup with to access 
to the practices HIS. In addition, while no specific training in data protection matters 
was given to staff at the time of the interview, the administrative manager was 
planning a talk from a data protection professional that would be mandatory for all 
staff. The importance of data protection was further highlighted when the 
administrative manager mentioned the problem with having a conversation pertaining 
to health information in an area that was accessible to the public. 
5.4.3  Area’s of concern for security and data protection  
The following areas were of some concern as in general the findings were that the 
levels of control and protection applied in the practices as a whole were not adequate. 
 
Only half of the surveyed practices had a written data protection policy and those were 
the practices that were part of a larger organisation that maintained a data protection 
policy for the organisation as a whole. However this matter is somewhat mitigated by 
the inherent understanding of the need for data protection in the practices as a whole. 
 
There are concerns with the level of access that administrative staff gets to personal 
health data. While all respondents stated that such access was necessary for the staff to 
perform their duties, only one responded that their administrative staff could only view 
and not modify the personal health information contained in their HIS. 
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There is scope for formalised training of staff in the area of data protection, while the 
implicit understanding of data protection is good, there was no specific data protection 
training taking place in the surveyed practices. 
 
Another area of general weakness was the monitoring of the devices connected to the 
practices network for vulnerabilities such as security patches that need to be applied. 
There was scope for the improvement of this. Also, there was a lack of an intrusion 
detection system in at least half of the surveyed practices. 
 
The majority of the client computers that connected to the networks of the small 
medical practice were running Windows XP, as per (National Security Agency, 2011), 
and echoed in the security model constructed in chapter 4 of this document, it is 
advisable that practices upgrade to Windows Vista or Windows 7 operating systems. 
 
None of the server computers that the small medical practices used employed any disk 
level encryption protections. However, this failing against the security model was 
mitigated with the fact that strong physical access controls were in place for all the 
practices and that all the practices took the destruction of data on retired storage media 
seriously. Another potential risk to medical practices was that those with a smaller 
network that was not part of a larger organisation did not employ network 
segmentation techniques to isolate their servers. 
5.4.4  Findings broken down by question categorisation 
Documented procedural protections and policy compliance matters. 
 
The procedures and practices in place for compliance were generally adequate. An area 
that could be improved on in general was that of a written data protection policy and a 
written policy for deciding the level of access that staff requires to PHI. 
 
Computer account and PHI access controls. 
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Overall the controls applied to computer accounts and access to PHI was very rigorous 
and adequate to meet the requirement to protect the PHI in place. This was one of the 
better areas of compliance with the security model. 
 
Controls and protections applied to physical files. 
 
In general the protections and controls applied to physical files are categorised as being 
somewhat adequate for data protection purposes. In this area there is room for 
improvement for by example ensuring that physical files are maintained in a more 
secure environment. 
 
Staff training, understanding and control matters 
 
Staff training for data protection could be improved in general. On the whole the 
protections and measures taken were somewhat adequate but there was considerable 
scope for improvement. The implicit understanding evident in the practices of data 
protection should mitigate this, but as was quoted in one of the examples from a 
practice, there is potential for a problem here. 
 
Assigned responsibilities for security matters 
 
This was very much a mixed bag; there is an understanding that such matters should be 
assigned for some-ones attention but the understanding of the specifics, such as 
vulnerability monitoring was not evident from the analysis of the interviews carried 
out with the non-technical practice managers and similar staff. 
 
Inside state data classification security measures 
 
Overall the technical protections applied to the “Inside” data classification state are 
somewhat adequate. There are some matters for concern as there is uncertainty as to 
whether transport level communication protections such as end-to-end encryption are 
applied to communications between HIS applications and client computers. While this 
problem could also be categorised into the “Over” data state classification it is being 
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dealt with here as such a change would probably require modification of the HIS 
application. 
 
Also, it is unclear if the health information systems that the practices utilise comply 
with the security standards specified in the security model. Investigations were carried 
out to try to determine this, including contacting a leading provider of HIS software in 
Ireland, but it was not possible to determine either way if the software in the surveyed 
practices meets the security standards or not. 
 
Outside state data classification security measures 
 
The “Outside” data classification state was very well protected to an adequate or 
somewhat adequate level. This was very encouraging as much of the attack surface for 
access to PHI comes from “Outside” systems such as client computers being infected 
with malware that puts the PHI at risk and while the protections were not perfect, one 
practice could implement a better policy for patching client computer systems for 
example, the results were encouraging. 
 
Over state data classification security measures 
 
The “Over” data classification state was generally also well disposed for security 
measures, area’s that could be improved included implementing segregation of the 
network that the server computers were connected to in some of the practices. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodology by which the experiment was conducted 
along with the results of the experiment. 
 
The constructed security model was found to be valid by the security expert that who 
analysed it. 
 
Overall the level of technical security protections in the small medical practices was 
found to be adequate. This was contrasted with the procedural data protection matters, 
   109 
which while still mostly adequate, were not as well catered for as the technical matters. 
This was however mitigated by a deep underlying understanding of the necessity for 
privacy and data protection in the small medical practices. 
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6 CONCLUSION  
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this project was to construct a valid security model and then use it to 
determine the state of data protection and computer security in small medical practices 
in Ireland. The findings were that in general the security and data protection measures 
in the surveyed practices were adequate to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the personal health information that is entrusted to the small medical 
practices. There were some areas that required further coverage by the practices and 
these were noted. The security model would aid the practices in rectifying those 
deficiencies.  
6.2 Research Definition & Research Overview 
The area of interest for the research in this project was that of data protection and 
computer security. It focused specifically on applications of these two matters to small 
medical practices, while retaining a broad enough scope to prevent any other relevant 
material from being left out. The literature at hand was not found to be fully adequate 
for small medical practices purposes. 
 
The secondary research for this project was divided into two parts. A specific 
governance section focusing on data protection legislation and guidance and a 
computer security section that covers the measures and standards needed to secure 
systems that contain personal health information. In neither section was an approach 
found which took the same form as the model in this project, nor were the exact 
requirements and methods of this project met in any of the other surveyed literature.  
6.3 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
This project aims to contribute two things to the body of knowledge. Firstly a valid, 
unique security model that can be used to assess the level of data protection and 
computer security in a small medical practices. 
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Secondly it provides an assessment of the level of data protection and computer 
security in the surveyed small medical practices. This level of protection has been 
found to be adequate. 
6.4 Experimentation, Evaluation and Limitation 
The experiment first validated the security model and then applied it to the surveyed 
small medical practices to gauge the levels of data protection against the model. The 
experimentation was successful. The security model was found to be valid from a 
security perspective and the model was applicable to the surveyed practices. Also the 
level of data protection as described by the model overall was adequate in the surveyed 
small medical practices. 
 
There is the potential for bias in the findings because the respondents who were willing 
to participate in the study may be more likely to have an interest and concern for the 
area of data protection in their practices than a more random set of potential 
respondents. Also, the data set was of a limited size, only four practices were assessed, 
therefore it could not be said to be representative of the area as a whole. 
 
In addition the representative sample of small medical practices had a larger proportion 
of practices that existed within a larger parent organisation. This sampling was 
accidental and not intended; it was simply the way that it worked out. This sampling 
could be problematic, as it does not represent a large enough cross section of 
independent medical practitioners who are not part of a larger parent organisation yet 
still store and process medical data for their patients. 
6.5 Future Work & Research 
In future work the security model could be refined more, particularly along the lines 
that the security expert suggested, making it more authoritative and requiring the 
practices to take actions instead of suggesting they do so. 
 
Further research could be carried out from a larger data set, if possible a data set that 
was more random and less inclined to pay data protection specific attention. The 
research could also be taken into larger medical organisations such as hospitals. 
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It may also be helpful to target any further research specifically at stand-alone medical 
practices that are not part of a larger organisation as such practices are less likely to 
have the large scale facilities and support structure that are available to practices who 
are part of a parent organisation. 
 
Further work is also needed in the area of the health information systems in use in the 
practices. The constructed security model specifies security standards that could apply 
to the HIS as well as development practices such as code reviews that can be carried 
out to determine the level of security in the applications. It would be beneficial if such 
a study could be carried out. 
6.6 Conclusion 
If the findings of this project are representative of the state of data protection and 
computer security across small medical practices as a whole in Ireland then the 
implications for the patients who entrust their data to the practices are positive. While 
there are some shortcomings, overall the level of protection of that data is adequate. 
This also applies to a policy viewpoint as those in positions of governance have an 
assurance that their requirements are being met. It is not however possible to determine 
if this is the case though without further investigation. 
 
However from a policy perspective there is an initiative that could make the efforts of 
this project moot. If a unique health identifier was to be implemented, (Health 
Information and Quality Authority, 2009), and a Central Rerecords Systems, (CRS), 
that was hosted and administered by a central service provider retained and stored the 
personal health information of the patients, there would no longer be an onus on the 
individual practice to maintain and secure their own medical records. This service 
would be provided by another body and assuming that such a service were secure, the 
constructed security model in this project could at least start as a foundation to assure 
the security of such a system, there would be benefits to the medical practices no 
longer having to maintain their own records. This would be a better way to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of personal health information for small 
medical practices in Ireland than each practice maintaining their own records. 
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APPENDIX  A – DATA PROTECTION DEFINITIONS  
 
“Data means information in a form which can be processed. It includes both 
automated data and manual data. 
Automated data means, broadly speaking, any information on computer, or 
information recorded with the intention of putting it on computer. 
Manual data means information that is kept as part of a relevant filing system, or with 
the intention that it should form part of a relevant filing system. 
Relevant filing system means any set of information that, while not computerised, is 
structured by reference to individuals, or by reference to criteria relating to 
individuals, so that specific information is accessible. 
Personal data means data relating to a living individual who is or can be identified 
either from the data or from the data in conjunction with other information that is in, 
or is likely to come into, the possession of the data controller. This can be a very wide 
definition depending on the circumstances. 
Processing means performing any operation or set of operations on data, including: – 
obtaining, recording or keeping data, 
– collecting, organising, storing, altering or adapting the data, – retrieving, consulting 
or using the data, 
– disclosing the information or data by transmitting, disseminating or otherwise 
making it available, 
– aligning, combining, blocking, erasing or destroying the data. Data Subject is an 
individual who is the subject of personal data. 
Data Controllers are those who, either alone or with others, control the contents and 
use of personal data. Data Controllers can be either legal entities such as companies, 
Government Departments or voluntary organisations, or they can be individuals such 
as G.P.’s, pharmacists or sole traders. 
Data Processor is a person who processes personal data on behalf of a data 
controller, but does not include an employee of a data controller who processes such 
data in the course of his/her employment. Again individuals such as G.P.’s, 
pharmacists or sole traders are considered to be legal entities. 
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Sensitive personal data relates to specific categories of data which are defined as data 
relating to a person’s racial origin; political opinions or religious or other beliefs; 
physical or mental health; sexual life; criminal convictions or the alleged commission 
of an offence; trade union membership. 
You have additional rights in relation to the processing of any such data.” 
 
Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 A Guide For Data Controllers, (2011) 
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APPENDIX  B – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Practice Background Information 
 
Roughly, how many of the practice have for the following 
 
Patients: 
 
Doctors: 
 
Nurses: 
 
Other Staff: 
 
Governance and procedural Questions 
 1. Is	  your	  practice	  registered	  as	  a	  data	  processor	  of	  health	  data?	  
 
 2. Is	  there	  an	  internal	  data	  protection	  policy	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  personal	  data	  held?	  
 3. Do	  you	  have	  a	  policy	  for	  who	  needs	  access	  to	  health	  information?	  (The	  Data	  Protection	  Commissioner	  stipulates	  that:	  Access	  to	  any	  personal	  data	  
within	  an	  organisation	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  authorised	  staff	  on	  a	  ‘need-­‐to-­‐
know’	  basis	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  defined	  policy)?	  
 a. Can	  administrative	  staff	  access	  patient	  information	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  that	  medical	  staff	  can,	  including	  to	  modify	  it?	  
 b. If	  so,	  what	  is	  the	  need	  for	  this?	  
 
 4. Is	  access	  to	  computer	  equipment	  password	  protected?	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a. Including	  unlocking	  a	  screen?	  How	  long	  does	  it	  take	  for	  a	  screen	  to	  lock	  or	  is	  there	  a	  policy	  of	  staff	  automatically	  locking	  their	  screens	  when	  they	  are	  not	  in	  use?	  
 b. Is	  there	  a	  centralised	  logon	  service	  for	  usernames	  and	  passwords?	  
 c. Do	  users	  share	  usernames	  and	  passwords?	  
 d. How	  to	  locum	  doctors	  get	  access	  to	  the	  data	  they	  need?	  
 e. Is	  there	  a	  password	  change	  policy,	  including	  for	  when	  users	  leave	  
 f. Are	  access	  restrictions	  applied	  to	  sensitive	  data,	  i.e.	  do	  you	  need	  a	  username	  and	  password	  to	  access	  any	  EHR/	  HIS	  systems	  you	  have,	  are	  the	  passwords	  for	  that	  different	  from	  the	  passwords	  you	  use	  to	  log	  onto	  your	  computer?	  
 g. Are	  global	  permissions	  used,	  i.e.	  by	  default	  all	  users	  get	  access	  to	  any	  and	  all	  information?	  
 h. What	  is	  the	  procedure	  for	  when	  new	  staff	  joins	  for	  them	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  information	  	  
 5. Is	  a	  designated	  person	  responsible	  for	  security	  and	  for	  periodic	  reviews	  of	  the	  measures	  and	  practices	  in	  place?	  
 a. If	  so,	  how	  often	  are	  those	  reviews	  carried	  out?	  
 6. Physical	  Files:	  
 a. Do	  you	  have	  a	  shredder	  for	  sensitive	  printed	  materials	  or	  a	  similar	  mechanism?	  
 b. Is	  access	  to	  manual,	  physical	  records	  controlled?	  
 c. Are	  filing	  cabinets	  locked	  when	  not	  in	  use,	  how	  is	  access	  to	  the	  keys	  controlled?	  
 7. Are	  staff	  members	  trained	  in	  security	  and	  data	  protection	  matters?	  
 a. Would	  staff	  be	  disciplined	  for	  data	  breaches?	  Is	  there	  a	  formalised	  procedure	  for	  such?	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 b. Have	  all	  persons	  in	  the	  practice	  (not	  already	  covered	  by	  a	  professional	  confidentiality	  code)	  signed	  a	  confidentiality	  agreement	  that	  explicitly	  makes	  clear	  their	  duties	  in	  relation	  to	  personal	  health	  information	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  breaching	  that	  duty.	  
 c. Are	  staff	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  patient	  confidentiality	  so	  that	  patient	  information	  is	  never	  given	  out	  inappropriately	  especially	  over	  the	  phone?	  
 8. Can	  you	  identify	  your	  Data	  Controller’s?	  
 a. Are	  your	  data	  controllers	  aware	  of	  their	  requirements	  to	  keep	  data	  protected,	  including	  the	  technical	  requirements?	  
 9. Who	  are	  your	  data	  processors?	  
 10. Do	  you	  have	  a	  data	  retention	  policy?	  i.e.	  how	  long	  do	  you	  maintain	  records	  on	  users	  for.	  	  	  Do	  you	  have:	  
• A	  defined	  policy	  on	  retention	  periods	  for	  all	  items	  of	  personal	  data	  kept	  
• Management,	  clerical	  and	  computer	  procedures	  in	  place	  to	  implement	  such	  a	  policy.	  
 11. Do	  you	  have	  a	  data	  subject	  access	  request	  process?	  
 12. Do	  you	  have	  a	  data	  breach	  response	  plan?	  
 a. Have	  you	  ever	  suffered	  a	  data	  breach?	  
 13. Is	  patient	  information	  ever	  included	  in	  email,	  including	  internally	  in	  the	  office?	  
 a. Is	  email	  a	  secure	  form	  of	  communication?	  
 b. Is	  it	  possible	  to	  do	  so,	  i.e.	  copy	  and	  paste?	  
 c. Can	  Health	  data	  be	  saved	  on	  a	  USB	  key?	  
 14. Are	  you	  aware	  that	  the	  maximum	  fine	  for	  a	  data	  breach	  is	  €100,000?	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15. Are	  you	  concerned	  about	  data	  protection	  matters	  for	  the	  practice?	  
 a. Would	  you	  be	  willing	  to	  invest	  more	  in	  data	  protection	  matters?	  
 b. Would	  you	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  such	  services?	  
 c. Would	  you	  be	  willing	  to	  become	  compliant	  with	  any	  standards,	  etc	  in	  the	  area?	  
 16. Are	  you	  aware	  that	  the	  Health	  Information	  Bill	  proposed	  by	  the	  last	  government	  proposed	  greater	  use	  of	  health	  information	  and	  the	  need	  to	  secure	  and	  protect	  it?	  
 
Technical Questions 
 1. Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  technical	  and	  IT	  side	  of	  the	  practice?	  
 a. Do	  they	  monitor	  for	  vulnerabilities,	  i.e.	  Windows	  patches	  on	  Patch	  Tuesday?	  
 2. Do	  you	  have	  an	  EHR	  or	  HIS?	  
 a. If	  so,	  what	  is	  it?	  
 
b. Is your EHR/ HIS security certified, for any of the following? -­‐ ISO27001	  -­‐	  ISO	  27799:2008	  Health	  informatics	  -­‐	  Information	  security	  management	  in	  health	  using	  ISO/IEC	  27002	  -­‐ Health	  Level	  7,	  HL7	  -­‐ ISO/TS	  21091:2005	  Health	  informatics	  -­‐-­‐	  Directory	  services	  for	  security,	  communications	  and	  identification	  of	  professionals	  and	  patients	  -­‐ CEN	  13606	  -­‐	  Health	  informatics	  -­‐	  Electronic	  Health	  Record	  Communication	  (EN	  13606)	  European	  Standard	  -­‐ ASTM	  E1869	  -­‐	  04(2010)	  Standard	  Guide	  for	  Confidentiality,	  Privacy,	  Access,	  and	  Data	  Security	  Principles	  for	  Health	  Information	  Including	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  -­‐ Any	  other	  similar	  standard	  
 
 c. What data is contained in it? 
 
 d. Who is responsible for administering it? 
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e. If they are an external body is there any internal knowledge on the matter for 
audit purposes? 
 
f. Is a secure form of communication such as SSL/ TLS employed between the 
server and the clients that access it? 
 3. What	  type	  of	  router,	  firewall	  is	  in	  place?	  
 a. Is	  it	  configured	  as	  per	  manufactures	  requirements	  and	  recommendations?	  
 b. Is	  it	  hardened	  with	  all	  unnecessary	  services	  disabled?	  E.g.	  IP	  source	  routing?	  
 c. Do	  you	  know	  what	  services	  and	  protocols	  your	  router	  will	  pass	  or	  can	  you	  easily	  access	  that	  information?	  
 d. Do	  you	  have	  medical	  devices	  that	  connect	  to	  the	  network?	  a. If	  so,	  what	  are	  they?	  b. Do	  they	  have	  a	  computer	  operating	  system	  c. What	  are	  they	  used	  for	  d. Is	  someone	  responsible	  for	  administering	  them	  e. Do	  they	  store	  or	  record	  any	  health	  data	  f. Do	  they	  directly	  process	  any	  identifiable	  health	  data	  
 4. Do	  your	  computers	  connect	  to	  a	  wireless	  network?	  
 a. If	  so,	  can	  you	  access	  the	  HIS,	  HER	  or	  any	  other	  office	  system	  that	  can	  store	  or	  process	  health	  data	  from	  that	  wireless	  network?	  
 b. Is	  the	  wireless	  network	  encrypted	  and	  if	  so	  what	  level?	  a. Are	  other	  best	  practice	  wireless	  security	  procedures	  implemented	  
 5. Do	  you	  store	  medical	  data	  in	  another	  location	  on	  the	  network	  other	  than	  a	  EHR/	  HIS?	  E.g.	  letters	  and	  scanned	  documents	  on	  a	  file	  server,	  email,	  CRM,	  any	  kind	  of	  web	  database	  that	  collects	  data,	  say	  for	  booking	  appointments,	  etc.	  	  a. If	  so	  what	  access	  protections	  and	  encryption	  is	  in	  place	  if	  any?	  
 b. If	  so	  what	  type	  of	  data	  is	  retained,	  e.g.	  emails	  or	  records	  of	  letters?	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 c. Are	  any	  protections	  applied	  to	  the	  server/	  workstation	  that	  stores	  the	  data?	  
 d. Is	  any	  medical	  data	  stored	  on	  a	  webserver	  or	  a	  server	  that	  is	  running	  a	  web	  server	  process	  such	  as	  Apache	  or	  IIS	  
 6. Is	  there	  a	  procedure	  for	  when	  a	  computer,	  server,	  laptop,	  etc	  or	  a	  hard	  drive	  or	  other	  storage	  device	  is	  replaced	  to	  destroy	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  hard	  drive?	  
 7. Is	  your	  data	  backed	  up,	  if	  so	  how?	  Tape/	  Disk/	  Etc	  
 a. Is	  data	  backed	  up	  offsite?	  If	  so	  is	  it	  saved	  in	  an	  encrypted	  format?	  
 b. Have	  you	  tested	  your	  backup	  recovery	  capabilities?	  
 c. Is	  someone	  specifically	  responsible	  for	  backup’s?	  
 8. What	  OS	  do	  your	  client	  computers	  use?	  
 a. Do	  you	  used	  any	  standard	  for	  securing	  client	  workstations,	  e.g.	  the	  Guide	  to	  Securing	  Microsoft	  Windows	  XP	  Systems	  for	  IT	  Professionals:	  A	  NIST	  Security	  Configuration	  Checklist	  
 b. How	  do	  your	  client	  computers	  receive	  operating	  system	  and	  other	  software	  updates?	  Are	  automatic	  updates	  enabled?	  
 c. Do	  users	  get	  administrative	  rights	  normally?	  
 d. Is	  there	  a	  centrally	  managed	  system	  for	  updates?	  
 e. Who	  monitors	  to	  ensure	  that	  your	  computers	  receive	  their	  updates?	  
 f. What	  Anti	  Virus	  Software	  is	  installed	  on	  them?	  
 g. Is	  it	  set	  to	  automatically	  update?	  
 h. Is	  it	  managed	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  automatically	  updates?	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i. Have	  you	  ever	  gotten	  a	  virus?	  
 j. Do	  you	  use	  full	  disk	  encryption	  or	  any	  other	  type	  of	  encrytion	  on	  laptops	  or	  other	  portable	  devices?	  
 k. Is	  medical	  and	  health	  data	  stored	  on	  individual	  workstations	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  central	  location?	  
 l. Is	  disk	  encryption	  used	  for	  laptops	  or	  storage	  media	  such	  as	  USB	  keys?	  
 9. What	  OS	  do	  your	  server	  computers	  use?	  Including	  any	  servers	  that	  run	  you’re	  his/	  EHR	  
 a. Are	  your	  servers	  hardened	  as	  to	  best	  practices	  and	  supplier	  recommendations?	  If	  so,	  what	  standards	  or	  recommendations	  are	  used?	  E.g.	  Microsoft	  Exchange	  Server	  2003	  Security	  Hardening	  Guide6	  
 b. Do	  you	  have	  a	  security	  policy	  in	  place	  for	  your	  servers?	  If	  so	  what	  is	  it	  based	  on?	  E.g.,	  SANS	  –	  Server	  Security	  Policy7.	  Also,	  SANS	  -­‐	  information-­‐security-­‐policy-­‐development-­‐guide-­‐large-­‐small-­‐companies_1331	  
 c. What	  OS	  level	  security	  technologies	  are	  in	  place?	  i. Data-­‐execution	  protection	  (DEP)	  ii. Address-­‐space	  layout	  randomization	  (ASLR)	  iii. Sandboxing	  iv. Code	  signing	  v. Application	  firewall	  vi. Does	  the	  files	  system	  on	  the	  server	  support	  file	  level	  security	  and	  encryption?	  
 d. Are	  the	  services	  a	  user	  can	  access	  on	  a	  server	  controlled?	  That	  is	  are	  Service	  Access	  Control	  Lists	  implemented	  or	  are	  all	  services	  globally	  available	  to	  all	  users?	  i. This	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  for	  any	  HIS/	  EHR	  software	  that	  is	  running	  
 e. Is	  the	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  server	  encrypted?	  
                                                
6 http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/en/details.aspx?FamilyId=6A80711F-E5C9-
4AEF-9A44-504DB09B9065&displaylang=en  
7 http://www.sans.org/security-resources/policies/Server_Security_Policy.pdf  
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 f. Do	  your	  servers	  employ	  signed	  certificates	  for	  authentication,	  encryption,	  non	  repudiation,	  etc?	  
 g. What	  physical	  access	  controls	  are	  in	  place	  for	  access	  to	  servers?	  
 h. Patching	  policy	  for	  server	  and	  client	  software?	  i. Whose	  responsibility	  is	  this?	  
 i. Is	  RAID	  or	  another	  form	  of	  disk	  redundancy	  used?	  
 j. Are	  your	  servers	  connected	  to	  a	  specific	  server	  network	  or	  do	  they	  implement	  their	  own	  firewall’s	  to	  replicate	  such	  a	  state?	  
 10. Do	  you	  have	  a	  remote	  access	  policy?	  For	  both	  staff	  and	  contractors?	  
 a. Can	  data	  be	  accessed	  from	  a	  remote	  site,	  e.g.	  VPN?	  If	  so	  how	  and	  what	  security	  measures	  are	  in	  place?	  
 b. Can	  third	  party	  contractors	  access	  your	  medical	  data?	  If	  so,	  how	  and	  when?	  Is	  there	  a	  formal	  agreement	  in	  place	  to	  monitor,	  request	  and	  control	  that?	  Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  those	  controls?	  
 c. Are	  VPN’s,	  either	  SSL	  or	  IPSEC	  used	  for	  this?	  
 11. Do	  you	  have	  a	  means	  for	  detecting	  and	  preventing	  data	  breach’s	  or	  security	  incidents?	  E.g.	  an	  IDS	  
 12. Are	  there	  any	  “Cloud”	  or	  online,	  internet	  hosted	  third	  party	  services	  used	  where	  medical	  information	  could	  be	  stored,	  e.g.	  online	  backups	  or	  other	  file	  storage	  services?	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APPENDIX C – CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE 
SECURITY EXPERT ON THE MODEL  
Correspondence 1, from Security Expert 
 
Hi Sean, 
  
I had a look at it again last night and I guess I still have the same 
thoughts/recommendations as before, but also one or two more ideas to consider. 
Below are my main points from last time and from looking again last night. 
  
1. Inside, outside, over differentiation 
                - Systems or states 
                - I think maybe it could be made clearer that for example data can be in the 
‘over’ state while at the same time a system can be an ‘over’ system if it helps data to 
be in the ‘over’ state. 
  
2. Another very useful set of hardening standards are the cis guidelines. We make use 
of these regularly. They are very good and cover many platforms. 
                - www.cisecurity.org 
  
3. Possibly rework the overall model to: 
A. Start with a type of thing to be secured 
B. Then go down the state 
... easier to actually implement the model 
e.g. Step 1 – We have some data. Step 2 – We want to protect it while in the ‘over’ 
state. Step 3 – Move down to the specific configuration steps for ‘data’ in the ‘over’ 
state. Step 4 – Move down to any relevant standards for this ‘data’ in the ‘over’ state. 
  
4. Always look at it from the perspective of a person who is implementing it and see 
how they would work their way through the model to get the outcome that they should 
get. 
  
   137 
5. Consider solidifying the actual final steps to implement the standard. The two main 
standards that we use are ISO27001 and PCI. The reason I personally prefer PCI is that 
the person implementing it is given more solid steps to actually get into compliance 
with it. ISO is more vague and so therefore difficult to know whether you are actually 
in compliance. For a masters thesis I’m sure you wouldn’t be expected to have all the 
scenarios nailed but you could potentially have a mention that a fuller release version 
of the model would go in that direction ... If you agreed with me of course! J 
  
6. What has to be done rather than what could be done ... 
- People must follow what it says in order to comply 
- From reading at a couple of parts it feels like you are giving some recommendations 
whereas if you are looking at this as a security model that people can become 
compliant with, implementation steps should be worded as though you are demanding 
that this be done. E.g. ISO uses the word ‘shall’ a lot. The word must is similar. 
Basically if you don’t do this you are not compliant, not just well you can do this if 
you feel like it. It should be a minimum set of requirements that they must fill in as a 
base. They can go over as much as they want but they will not be considered as 
compliant unless they reach a certain point that you specify. 
  
7. Similarity to PCI in that the main goal is protection of one thing ... PHI. In PCI that 
one thing is Credit Card Information. Therefore you could possibly take some ideas 
from PCI in this regard. E.g. 
- In order to comply with the standard, a defined scope is needed. This will include any 
area of the network that transmits, processes or stores PHI information (ref. Inside, 
outside or over state). Any area within this scope must follow the standard fully, 
otherwise it is not in compliance. Any area that is not in scope must be provably so. 
This could be for example a separate wireless network that the medical practice run in 
their waiting room. There should be no link to any servers and no possibly way of 
penetrating through to these. 
- Regularly monitor and test networks. 
- Etc. Check out the 'Control Objectives' of PCI for an overview. The Wikipedia has a 
brief summary. 
  
I hope this helps. 
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I can call you at lunch time or after work today if you like. 
  
Regards, 
Darren Fitzpatrick 
Information Risk and Compliance Consultant 
  
Correspondence 2, Authors Follow up 
 
That’s great Darren, sorry I didn't get back to you yesterday but you know how it is. 
The feedback you have sent is really useful. 
  
For point 3 below, a way of re-working the model. I think what you describe is 
actually what I am trying to achieve, i.e. you have this PHI to protect, it can be in 
several 'states' so you look at each state and then take action on each to protect the PHI, 
those actions could also be categorized down further. So I suspect we are signing off 
the same hymn-sheet. It may be more likely that the way I expressed this idea is 
confusing and that needs some re-work, so I will try to do that. 
  
Also the way of looking at it from the perspective of who will be applying it is really 
important too, I don't think I will be able to do much to re-workl the model from that 
direction with the short time frame but I am going to mention that you said that in the 
dissertation document. The same for solidifying the actual steps and making them 
more concrete, that too is great advise and I wish I hadn't left it so late to get it from 
you. 
  
Would you be happy to describe the model as valid? I.e. that it is an effective way of 
securing PHI in small medical practices, with or without your changes? 
 
 
Correspondence 3, Security expert’s subsequent response 
 
No problem Sean. 
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Yes, if we had more time we probably could have worked together some more, but it is 
looking good anyway. Thinking back to my masters too I would think that you 
bringing me on-board will sound pretty good and hopefully it helped a little. From the 
looks of things I’d say you will do well. 
  
Given the guidance provide using the concepts of systems and services classifications, 
their relevant security measures and resources and the ‘state’ in which data is secured, 
I would be happy to describe the model as valid. The model, in its current state seems 
conceptually sound as the foundations of a usable security model for PHI in small 
medical practices. 
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APPENDIX D - INTERVIEW ANALYSIS, ALL QUESTIONS 
      Practice Number 
	  
Question	  Details	   1	   2	   3	   4	  
	   	  
Data	  Protection	  and	  Governance	  
	  
Question	  
	   	   	   	  
Question	  
classification	   	  
1	   Registration	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
1	   	  
2	   DP	  Policy	   not	   not	   adq	   adq	   1	   	  
3	   PHI	  Access	  Policy	   not	   not	   adq	   adq	   1	   	  
3a	   Admin	  staff	   not	   not	   adq	   adq	   1	   	  
3b	   Need	  for	  staff	   adq	   some	   adq	   adq	   1	   	  
4	   Password	  Protected	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   2	   	  
4a	   Screen	  lock	   some	   some	   some	   adq	   2	   	  
4b	   Directory	  Service	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   2	   	  
4c	   logon	  sharing	   some	   some	   adq	   adq	   2	   	  
4d	   locums	   adq	   some	   adq	   adq	   1	   	  
4e	   password	  changes	   adq	   not	   adq	   adq	   2	   	  
4f	   sesnitive	  data	  restricted	   some	   adq	   adq	   adq	   2	   	  
4g	   global	  perms	   not	   not	   adq	  
	  
2	   	  
4h	   new	  staff	  policy	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   2	  
	  5	   person	  check	  security	   some	   some	   adq	  
	  
1	  
	  5a	   review	  period	   not	   not	   some	  
	  
1	  
	  6a	   shredder	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   3	  
	  6b	   access	  to	  files	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
3	  
	  6c	   locked	  cabinet	   some	   adq	   adq	  
	  
3	  
	  7	   security	  training	   some	   some	   some	   adq	   4	  
	  7a	   staff	  disciplined?	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   4	  
	  7b	   contracts	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   4	  
	  7c	   staff	  awareness	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   4	  
	  8	   id	  controllers	   not	   some	   not	   adq	   4	  
	  8a	   controller	  awareness	   some	   adq	   not	   adq	   4	  
	  9	   processors	   some	   adq	  
	  
adq	   4	  
	  10	   data	  retention	  	   adq	   some	   some	   adq	   1	  
	  10a	   periods	   some	   not	   some	   adq	   1	  
	  10b	   procedures	  for	  retention	   not	   not	   not	   adq	   1	  
	  11	   subject	  access	  req	   some	   some	   adq	   adq	   1	  
	  12	   data	  breach	  response	   not	   not	   adq	   adq	   1	  
	  12a	   sufferred	  a	  data	  breach	   not	   not	   adq	  
	  
1	  
	  13	   PHI	  in	  email	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   2	  
	  13a	   is	  email	  secure	   not	   adq	   adq	   adq	   4	  
	  13b	   copy	  and	  paste	   adq	   some	   some	   not	   2	  
	  13c	   PHI	  on	  usb	   adq	   some	   some	   adq	   2	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14	   max	  fine	   not	   not	   adq	   adq	   4	  
	  15	   concerned	  about	  dp	   not	   adq	   adq	  
	  
4	  
	  15a	   willing	  to	  invest	   not	   not	   not	  
	  
4	  
	  15b	   pay	  for	  such	   not	   not	   not	  
	  
4	  
	  15c	   willing	  to	  become	  compliant	   some	   adq	   adq	  
	  
4	  
	  16	   HIB	  awareness	   not	   adq	   adq	  
	  
4	  
	  Technical	  Questions	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  1	   who	  responsible	  for	  IT	   adq	   some	   adq	  
	  
5	  
	  1a	   vuln	  monitoring	   not	   some	   some	  
	  
5	  
	  2	   HIS?	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   6	  
	  2a	   what	  HIS	  
	   	   	   	  
6	  
	  2b	   HIS	  security	  certified	   not	   not	   adq	   adq	   6	  
	  2c	   data	  in	  HIS?	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   6	  
	  2d	   who	  is	  responsible	  for	  HIS	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   6	  
	  2e	   internal	  knowledge	  of	  HIS	   not	   not	   some	   not	   6	  
	  2f	   secure	  comms	  HIS	   some	   not	   adq	   adq	   6\8	  
	  3	   Router/	  Firewall	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  3a	   configured	  properly	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  3b	   hardened	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  3c	   id	  services?	   not	   not	  
	  
adq	   8	  
	  3d	   medical	  devices	   some	   some	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  4	   wireless	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  4a	   access	  HIS	  from	  wlan	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  4b	   wireless	  encrypted	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  4ba	   other	  wlan	  sec	  configs	   some	   adq	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  5	   store	  PHI	  outside	  HIS	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  5a	   protection	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  5b	   type	  of	  data	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  5c	   protection	  to	  host	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  5d	   PHI	  on	  webserver	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  6	   data	  destruction	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  7	   backups	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7\8	  
	  7a	   offsite	   some	   some	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  7b	   tested	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  7c	   person	  responsible	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7	  
	  8	   client	  os	   some	   some	   some	   some	   7	  
	  8a	   os	  sec	  config	  templates	   adq	   not	   some	  
	  
7	  
	  8b	   os	  patches	   not	   adq	   some	  
	  
7	  
	  8c	   user	  admin	  rights	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7	  
	  8d	   central	  managed	  updates	   not	   some	   some	  
	  
7	  
	  8e	   who	  monitors	  updates	   not	   some	   some	  
	  
7	  
	  8f	   AV	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7	  
	  8g	   av	  updates	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7	  
	  8h	   av	  managed	   adq	   some	  
	   	  
7	  
	  8i	   got	  a	  virus	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7	  
	  8j	   disk	  encryption	  for	  portables	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7\8	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8k	   PHI	  on	  workstations	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7	  
	  8l	   laptop	  encryption	   some	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7\8	  
	  9	   server	  os	   some	   adq	   some	   adq	   7	  
	  9a	   server	  hardening	   adq	   some	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  9b	   server	  security	  policy	  	   adq	   not	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  9c	   os	  security	  mechanisms	  
	   	   	  
adq	   7	  
	  9d	   sacls	  
	   	   	  
adq	   7	  
	  9e	   server	  encrypted	   not	   not	  
	  
not	   7	  
	  9f	   certs	  
	   	   	   	  
7	  
	  9g	   physical	  access	  controls	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  9h	   server	  patching	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   7	  
	  9i	   RAID	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7	  
	  9j	   server	  vlan	   adq	   not	   not	  
	  
8	  
	  10	   VPN	  policy	   adq	   adq	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  10a	   access	  PHI	  from	  VPN	   adq	   some	   adq	   adq	   8	  
	  10b	   contractors	  access	   adq	   not	   adq	  
	  
5	  
	  10c	   sec	  measures	   adq	  
	   	   	  
7	  
	  11	   IDS	   adq	   not	   not	  
	  
8	  
	  12	   Cloud	   adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
7	  
	   
Key	  
not	  =	  Not	  adequate	  
some	  =	  Somewhat	  adequate	  
adq	  =	  Adequate	  
	  Classification	  of	  interview	  questions	  
1:	  documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  policy	  compliance	  
2:	  account	  &	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
3:	  physical	  files	  
4:	  Staff	  training	  and	  control	  matters	  
5:	  Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
6:	  Inside	  
7:	  Outside	  
8:	  Over	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APPENDIX F - AGGREGATED RESULTS BY 
CLASSIFICATION OF INTERVIEW QUESTION  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1:	  Documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  
policy’s	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  9	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  4	  
	   	   	   	  2:	  Account	  &	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
	   	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  7	   SOME	  =	  3	   NOT	  =	  1	  
	   	   	   	  3:	  Physical	  files	  
	   	   	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  0	   SOME	  =	  3	   NOT	  =	  0	  
	   	   	   	  4:	  Staff	  training	  and	  control	  matters	  
	   	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  4	   SOME	  =	  6	   NOT	  =	  4	  
	   	   	   	  5:	  Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  1	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  1	  
	   	   	   	  6:	  Inside	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  3	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  1	  
	   	   	   	  7:	  Outside	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  25	   SOME	  =	  7	   NOT	  =	  1	  
	   	   	   	  8:	  Over	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  7	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  2	  
	   	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  1	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  0	  
	   	   	   	  Combination	  Classifications	  
	   	   	   	  
6\8	   adq	   some	   adq	   adq	  
access	  PHI	  from	  
VPN	   adq	  
7\8	   adq	   not	   adq	  
	  
contractors	  access	   adq	  
7\8	   adq	  
	   	   	  
sec	  measures	  
7\8	   adq	   not	   not	  
	  
IDS	   not	  
	  
adq	   adq	   adq	  
	  
Cloud	   adq	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Key	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  not	  =	  Not	  adequate	  
	   	   	   	   	  some	  =	  Somewhat	  adequate	  
	   	   	   	  adq	  =	  Adequate	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Classification	  of	  interview	  questions	  
	   	   	  1:	  documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  policy	  compliance	  
	   	  2:	  account	  &	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
	   	   	   	  3:	  physical	  files	  
	   	   	   	   	  4:	  Staff	  training	  and	  control	  matters	  
	   	   	   	  5:	  Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
	   	   	  6:	  Inside	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  7:	  Outside	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  8:	  Over	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APPENDIX E  – FINDINGS BY CLASSIFICATION FOR 
INDIVIDUAL PRACTICE  
Practice	  1	  
	   	   	  1:	  Documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  
policy’s	  
ADQ	  =	  7	   SOME	  =	  3	   NOT	  =	  4	   N/A	  =	  0	  
2:	  Account	  &	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
	  ADQ	  =	  5	   SOME	  =	  4	   NOT	  =	  2	   N/A	  =	  0	  
3:	  Physical	  files	  
	   	  ADQ	  =	  1	   SOME	  =	  2	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  0	  
4:	  Staff	  training	  and	  control	  matters	  
	  ADQ	  =	  4	   SOME	  =	  2	   NOT	  =	  7	   N/A	  =	  0	  
5:	  Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
ADQ	  =	  2	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  1	   N/A	  =	  0	  
6:	  Inside	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  3	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  2	   N/A	  =	  1	  
7:	  Outside	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  23	   SOME	  =	  6	   NOT	  =	  3	   N/A	  =	  1	  
8:	  Over	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  7	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  1	   N/A	  =	  3	  
	   	   	   	  Practice	  2	  
	   	   	  1:	  Documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  
policy’s	  
ADQ	  =	  5	   SOME	  =	  4	   NOT	  =	  5	   N/A	  =	  0	  
2:	  Account	  &	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
	  ADQ	  =	  8	   SOME	  =	  3	   NOT	  =	  1	   N/A	  =	  0	  
3:	  Physical	  files	  
	   	  ADQ	  =	  1	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  1	   N/A	  =	  0	  
4:	  Staff	  training	  and	  control	  matters	  
	  ADQ	  =	  5	   SOME	  =	  3	   NOT	  =	  6	   N/A	  =	  0	  
5:	  Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
ADQ	  =	  0	   SOME	  =	  2	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  1	  
6:	  Inside	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  3	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  2	   N/A	  =	  1	  
7:	  Outside	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  24	   SOME	  =	  6	   NOT	  =	  3	   N/A	  =	  0	  
8:	  Over	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  5	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  3	   N/A	  =	  3	  
	   	   	   	  Practice	  3	  
	   	   	  1:	  Documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  
policy’s	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ADQ	  =	  13	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  0	  
2:	  Account	  &	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
	  ADQ	  =	  7	   SOME	  =	  2	   NOT	  =	  2	   N/A	  =	  0	  
3:	  Physical	  files	  
	   	  ADQ	  =	  0	   SOME	  =	  2	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  0	  
4:	  Staff	  training	  and	  control	  matters	  
	  ADQ	  =	  9	   SOME	  =	  2	   NOT	  =	  3	   N/A	  =	  0	  
5:	  Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
ADQ	  =	  1	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  0	  
6:	  Inside	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  4	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  1	  
7:	  Outside	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  26	   SOME	  =	  4	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  2	  
8:	  Over	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  6	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  1	   N/A	  =	  4	  
	   	   	   	  Practice	  4	  
	   	   	  1:	  Documented	  procedural	  protections	  and	  
policy’s	  
ADQ	  =	  12	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  2	  
2:	  Account	  &	  PHI	  access	  controls	  	  
	  ADQ	  =	  7	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  4	  
3:	  Physical	  files	  
	   	  ADQ	  =	  3	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  0	  
4:	  Staff	  training	  and	  control	  matters	  
	  ADQ	  =	  7	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  1	   N/A	  =	  6	  
5:	  Assigned	  responsibilities	  for	  security	  matters	  
ADQ	  =	  0	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  2	  
6:	  Inside	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  4	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  1	   N/A	  =	  1	  
7:	  Outside	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  19	   SOME	  =	  1	   NOT	  =	  0	   N/A	  =	  13	  
8:	  Over	  
	   	   	  ADQ	  =	  8	   SOME	  =	  0	   NOT	  =	  1	   N/A	  =	  3	  
 
Key	  
not	  =	  Not	  adequate	  
some	  =	  Somewhat	  adequate	  
adq	  =	  Adequate	  
 
 
